Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

In 1992, Haddad purchased a condominium. He timely paid association assessments and lived at the home until 2005. Since then, the condominium has remained vacant or leased. In October 2008, Haddad received a collection letter from the firm, representing the condominium association, stating that Haddad he was in default on $898 of association dues and that if the amount was not paid within 30 days, the association would commence proceedings for a lien against the condominium. In December 2008, Haddad received a second notice. Haddad timely responded to both, requesting verification of the debt. The firm did not verify the debts and recorded a Notice of Lien in May 2009. The condominium association eventually corrected its records. The lien was discharged in 2010. Haddad sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the Michigan Collection Practices Act (445.251), alleging violations of prohibitions on use of false, deceptive, or misleading representation and continuing collection of a disputed debt without verification of a debt incurred for personal rather than business purposes. The district court granted the firm summary judgment, holding that the assessments were not debts under the statutes because the property was a rental. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC" on Justia Law

Diana Albrecht brought a class-action lawsuit against Alaska Trustee, LLC, on behalf of a group of Alaska homeowners who had faced foreclosure on their homes. Alaska Trustee, acting as foreclosure trustee, had provided Albrecht and the other homeowners reinstatement quotes that included the costs of foreclosure. Albrecht maintained that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in her reinstatement quote violated her right to cure under a former version of AS 34.20.070(b), the non-judicial foreclosure statute, which provided that a homeowner’s "default may be cured by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default." According to Albrecht, Alaska Trustee's inclusion of foreclosure costs in addition to "attorney's fees or court costs" constituted a violation of not only the non-judicial foreclosure statute but also Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The superior court concluded that Albrecht lacked standing to sue and denied her motion for class certification. The superior court further ruled that Alaska Trustee's practice of including various fees and charges as foreclosure costs was permitted under the statute. The superior court awarded attorney's fees to Alaska Trustee as the prevailing party, enhancing those fees under AS 45.50.537(b) on the ground that Albrecht's claims were frivolous. Because the inclusion of foreclosure costs in a reinstatement quote did not violate AS 34.20.070, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in most respects. But because the Court concluded that Albrecht’s claims were not frivolous and attorney's fees could not be awarded under Rule 82 for time spent litigating the structure of a class action, the Court remanded for recalculation of fees awarded. View "Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether particular officers and employees of a bank owed a quasi-fiduciary duty to particular bank depositors. Michael and Theresa Annechino deposited a large amount of money at a bank specifically to ensure that their savings would be protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Annechinos relied on bank employees’ recommendations of how to structure their accounts to meet FDIC coverage rules. Unfortunately, the bank went into receivership, and the FDIC found that nearly $500,000 of the Annechinos’ deposits were not insured. The Annechinos alleged that individual officers and employees of the bank owed them a duty, the breach of which resulted in their loss. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. The officers and employees of the bank did not owe the Annechinos a quasi-fiduciary duty. Holding the officers and employees personally liable under these facts would have contravened established law regarding liability for acts committed on behalf of a corporation or principal. View "Annechino v. Worthy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, argued that a series of automated telephone calls placed to his home by Best Buy violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Washington Automatic Dialing and Announcing Device Act (WADAD), Wash. Rev. Code 80.36.400. The court concluded that these calls were aimed at encouraging listeners to engage in future commercial transactions with Best Buy to purchase its goods. They constituted unsolicited advertisements, telephone solicitations, and telemarketing, and were prohibited by the TCPA, the WADAD, and the Washington Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code 80.36.400(3). View "Chesbro v. Best Buy Co., Inc." on Justia Law

PRA appealed the district court's order granting plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and provisional class certification. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that PRA's debt collection efforts violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the order; the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a provisional class for purposes of the preliminary injunction; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., et al" on Justia Law

Owners of a duplex insured a building through two concurrently issued, identical policies - one for each unit. A fire damages the entire structure, and Insurer paid the owners' claims under both policies. Insurer then brought this action to determine its subrogation rights against the tenant (Tenant) of one of the duplex units, who was allegedly negligent in starting the fire. Insurer conceded the pursuant to Tri-Par Investments v. Sousa, Tenant was an implied coinsured under the policy covering the unit he lived in. Therefore, Insurer sought to recoup payments made for the damage only to the unit Tenant did not live in. The district court granted Tenant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting Tenant's motion for summary judgment, as the rule in Tri-Par Investments applies to bar subrogation against a duplex tenant as to both sides of the building; (2) ruling that Tenant was a coinsured with Owners under Nebraska law; (3) failing to rule that Insurer was allowed to subrogate against Tenant; and (4) denying Insurer's request for declaratory judgment. View "Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Humlicek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against numerous foreign airlines alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of state antitrust, consumer protection, and unfair competition laws. The district court dismissed those claims as expressly preempted by federal law. The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), preempted state-law claims "related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." The court concluded that "air carrier" in that provision applied to foreign air carriers and therefore, affirmed the judgment. View "In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Appellee initiated this putative class-action lawsuit against DIRECTV, seeking damages for herself individually and on behalf of other former DIRECTV subscribers who paid an early cancellation fee to DIRECTV after they terminated DIRECTV's service. Appellee alleged that DIRECTV's enforcement and collection of its early cancellation fee was deceptive and unconscionable in violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Appellee moved to certify the litigation as a class action. DIRECTV moved to compel Appellee to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration provision in the customer agreement that DIRECTV alleged had been mailed with Appellee's first billing statement. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration and granted Appellee's motion for class certification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied DIRECTV's motion to compel Appellee to arbitration on the basis that Appellee cancelled her service so quickly she did not assent to the arbitration agreement by her continued use of service; and (2) there was no merit to DIRECTV's arguments for reversal of the class-certification order. View "DIRECTV, Inc. v. Murray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Christie's under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and common law fraud claims under New York law. The claims related to alleged fraud in inflating the value of bottles of wine by falsely attributing them to Thomas Jefferson's wine collection. Because the court found no error in the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's claims were time-barred, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Koch v. Christie's International PLC" on Justia Law

Boggio and wife, Sarah, resided in Texas. Boggio served military tours, and assigned Sarah power of attorney. They separated; Boggio left the state. Six months later Sarah purchased a car with financing through USAA. Sarah allegedly signed Boggio’s name, unbeknownst to him, on the check issued to the car dealership. The car was later listed on Boggio’s car insurance. The divorce decree confirmed that the car was acquired during the marriage, identified the associated loan as a marital debt, and stated that Sarah alone would be responsible for payment. Later, Boggio, residing in Cincinnati, experienced credit problems due to missed payments. Boggio wrote to consumer reporting agencies and USAA disputing his status as co-obligor. USAA attempted to mail Boggio (but not his counsel) a copy of the allegedly forged check, but the letter was sent to an incorrect Texas address. Because Boggio would not go to Texas to file a police report, USAA declared the dispute a civil matter between the Boggios. In Boggio’s suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the district court granted summary judgment to USAA. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A reasonable jury could find that USAA’s investigation and notices were unreasonable.View "Boggio v. USAA Fed.l Sav. Bank" on Justia Law