Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Leyse received a prerecorded telemarketing call from a radio station. He sued, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2394, which prohibits certain prerecorded telemarketing calls. The district court dismissed, finding that the Federal Communications Commission had issued regulations exempting the type of call at issue from the TCPA’s prohibitions; that the FCC was authorized by Congress to do so; that the court should defer to the resulting regulation; and that the regulation passed muster under Chevron. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that “Chevron deference” applies to the regulation and that the regulation is valid under Chevron. The court rejected an argument that it lacked jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. View "Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad. Inc." on Justia Law

Suntree appealed from the district court's order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the motions for summary judgment filed by Ecosense and George Dussich with regard to Suntree's claims of false designation of origin and false advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, and deceptive and unfair trade practices pursuant to the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUPTA), Fla. Stat. 501.201 et seq. Both Suntree and Ecosense manufacture baffle boxes, a filtration product. Suntree contended that the district court erred in concluding that Suntree failed to establish that Ecosense and Dussich directly or contributorily infringed on their trademark because it failed to present evidence of actual or of a likelihood of confusion. The court disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "Suntree Technologies, Inc. v. Ecosense International, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 2002 Glover entered into a mortgage with WaMu. After being injured Glover fell behind on her mortgage in 2005 and requested a work-out agreement to reduce her payments. WaMu initially threatened to foreclose, but subsequently agreed to postpone her payments until the request had been evaluated. Eventually, WaMu denied the request. Murray, an attorney with Udren Law Offices, called Glover and informed her that she owed WaMu missed payments, attorney’s fees and costs, totaling $3,397.28. WaMu then filed a foreclosure complaint. After communications between Glover and WaMu‘s assignee, Wells Fargo, Glover entered into a loan modification agreement with Wells Fargo. Glover filed a putative class-action against WaMu, Wells Fargo, and the Udren firm, alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, premised on violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. An FDCPA claim was not timely because Glover’s amended pleadings did not provide the fair notice required for relatation back to her original filing View "Glover v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of identity theft, appealed the district court's dismissal of their Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court held that among its other deficiencies, the complaint failed to state a cognizable injury. The court found, however, that the complaint stated a cognizable injury for the purposes of standing and as a necessary element of injury in plaintiffs' Florida law claims. The court also concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged the causation element of negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint similarly alleged facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss on the restitution/unjust enrichment claim. However, the complaint failed to allege entitlement to relief under Florida law for the claims of negligence per se and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Curry, et al. v. AvMed, Inc." on Justia Law

Todd attempted to purchase claims against a collection agency (Franklin) from Fletcher. He then sued Franklin. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the assignment was void because Todd was using it merely to attempt to practice law without a license and that Todd failed to state a claim for relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The assignment was void as against public policy. Illinois public policy forbids the assignment of legal claims to non-attorneys in order to litigate without a license. Undisputed evidence showed that Todd created a business providing legal advice and repeatedly agreed to purchase claims in order to litigate. Even if the assignment was not void, Todd failed to state a claim. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act preempts state-law claims, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Todd did not attempt could not bring a claim directly under the FCRA because the section Franklin allegedly violated does not create a private right of action. View "Todd v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

In this putative class action, plaintiff alleged that HSBC and Best Buy (collectively, defendants) defrauded California customers by offering credit cards without adequately disclosing that cardholders would be subject to an annual fee. At issue was whether the district court erred when it considered extrinsic evidence in deciding defendants' motion to dismiss, and whether dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the district court properly incorporated the disclosure documents at issue and the court affirmed its order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action, on behalf of herself and the 181 other individuals in New York State who had received student loan collection letters from defendant. At issue was whether a debt collector's inaccurate representation to a debtor that her student loans were "ineligible" for bankruptcy discharge was a "false, misleading, or deceptive" debt collection practice, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The court held that it was because the least sophisticated consumer would interpret defendant's letter as representing, incorrectly, that bankruptcy discharge of her loans was wholly unavailable to her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Easterling v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law

The FTC sued defendants alleging that their online marketing of prepaid debit cards and short-term loans to consumers in the subprime market violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45. After the parties settled and stipulated to the terms of a Final Order, the FTC applied for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the Final Order through their marketing of two products: a shopping club membership program and a "no cost" debit card. The court affirmed the contempt order in its entirety and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned defendants for the full amount lost by consumers. View "FTC v. EDebitPay, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. At issue was whether a settlement offer for the full amount of statutory damages requested under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., mooted a claim brought pursuant to the FDCPA. The court held that the failure of defendants to offer judgment prevented the mooting of plaintiffs' FDCPA claims. The district court erred in concluding that defendants' offers of settlement were for full relief such that plaintiffs' cases were mooted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc.; Dellapietro v. ARS National Services, Inc.; Desty v. Collection Information Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against their Internet service providers (Providers). Providers' Internet service agreement contained an arbitration clause that required customers to submit damage claims against Insight to arbitration, and it barred class action litigation against Providers by their customers. The circuit court determined the class action ban was enforceable and dismissed Appellants' complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the contractual provision under which Appellants waived their right to participate in class action litigation was enforceable under federal law; (2) the service agreement's choice of law provision was not enforceable; (3) the service agreement's general arbitration provision was enforceable; and (4) the provision imposing a confidentiality requirement upon the litigants to arbitration proceedings was void and severable from the remaining portions of the agreement. Remanded for entry of a final judgment. View "Schnuerle v. Insight Commc'ns Co., LP" on Justia Law