Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Marco Marquez, the consumer, brought this action against Mercedes-Benz USA, alleging that his new car was a "lemon" under the state's Lemon Law, that he requested a refund and provided Mercedes-Benz with the required notice and information, and that Mercedez-Benz failed to provide a refund within the thirty-day period as required under the Lemon Law. At issue in this case was whether Marquez intentionally thwarted Mercedes-Benz's attempt to provide a refund within the thirty-day statutory period by failing to provide necessary information. On remand, the jury found in favor of Mercedes-Benz, but the circuit court entered a directed verdict in favor of Marquez, finding no credible evidence that Marquez intentionally thwarted Mercedes-Benz's efforts to provide a refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no credible evidence supported the jury's verdict, and therefore, the circuit court was not clearly wrong in directing the verdict in favor of Marquez. View "Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the scope of authority of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division to issue administrative subpoenas in aid of its investigation into potential unfair and deceptive trade practices. The Division in this case sought documents it claimed were relevant to its investigation of Washington Home Remodelers (WHR). WHR demurred, asserting that the Division overreached by seeking discovery into matters in which the regulatory authority resided exclusively with either the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) or the Maryland Home Improvement Commission under their respective enabling statutes. The circuit court ordered the subpoena's enforcement. WHR appealed, insisting that the Division subpoena was not authorized by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Division's subpoena was authorized by the Consumer Protection Act, and therefore, the Court did not need to delve into conflicting investigatory prerogatives of separate administrative agencies. View "Wash. Home Remodelers, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., Consumer Prot. Div." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves and others who purchased houses from a builder, Ryland, in the Newport subdivision of Vista Lakes, a residential development in Orlando, Florida. The Newport subdivision was adjacent to land known as "Pinecastle." Pinecastle was used as a bombing range during World War II and remained laden with, among other things, unexploded bombs. When plaintiffs bought houses from Ryland, they were unaware of Pinecastle. Later, after Pinecastle's existence became public, plaintiffs' houses lost considerable market value and plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to compensate for the loss. Counts 1, 3, and 4 sought compensation for the loss of value plaintiffs' houses sustained due to their close proximity to Pinecastle. Count 2 sought recovery of 1.5 percent of the purchase price of every home Ryland sold in the Newport subdivision. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 with prejudice and Count 3 without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count 4, pursuant to Rule 56. View "Virgilio, et al. v. Terrabrook Vista Lakes L.P., et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Warren and Wynne Kirschbaum appealed a trial court's ruling in favor of Appellee First Quality Carpets, Inc. arising from a dispute they had over carpet installed in 2007. The Kirschbaums argued that the civil division erred in awarding First Quality attorney's fees under 9 V.S.A. 4007(c) of the Prompt Pay Act because that section of the statute authorizing attorney's fees recovery effectively expired in 1996 pursuant to a sunset provision included in the Act. Alternatively, the Kirschbaums argued that because they withheld payment to First Quality in good faith, they were entitled to a directed verdict and that First Quality should not have been awarded attorney's fees under 4007(c). Finally, the Kirschbaums argued that the court erred in denying their counterclaim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "First Quality Carpets, Inc. v. Kirschbaum" on Justia Law

Pom challenged the name, labeling, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola's Pomegranate Blueberry beverage, claiming that Coca-Cola violated the false-advertising provisions of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and that Coca-Cola violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof'l Code 17200 et seq., and its False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof'l Code 17500 et seq. The district court partially granted Coca-Cola's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment to the extent it barred Pom's Lanham Act claim with respect to Pomegranate Blueberry's name and labeling. The court vacated the summary judgment to the extent it ruled that Pom lacked statutory standing on its UCL and FAL claims; the court remanded so that the district court could rule on the state claims. View "Pom Wonderful LLC v. The Coca Cola Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Neeltec Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Fireworks Supermarket, appealed an order requiring it to substitute two corporations as defendants in its SCUPTA suit in lieu of the individual Willard Long against whom it had brought suit. Petitioner operated a fireworks store near I-95. Defendant Long was alleged to have operated a competing fireworks store "Fireworks Superstore" near I-95. Petitioner alleged that Long first changed his store's name to closely resemble Petitioner's. Petitioner then redecorated the outside of his building facing I-95 traffic with an advertising display. Long allegedly retaliated by moving a 45- foot long, 9-foot tall storage container onto his property, effectively blocking travelers' views of Petitioner's wall advertisement. Petitioner alleged that, by his actions, Long had violated the SCUTPA. Long answered, and subsequently filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Substitution of Parties." Long asserted he never owned the Fireworks Superstore, but that it had been owned by Hobo Joes, Inc., when the suit was commenced and was now owned by Foxy's Fireworks Superstore, Inc., both South Carolina corporations.  He sought either summary judgment because Petitioner had sued the wrong party or an order that Long be dropped as a party and that Hobo Joe's and Foxy's Fireworks be added as defendants. The special referee granted Long's motion in part, finding he was not "the proper defendant. Petitioner appealed and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the order requiring Petitioner to discontinue its SCUPTA suit against Long affected its substantial right to name its defendant, making it immediately appealable. The decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for consideration of the merits of Petitioner's appeal. View "Neeltec Enterprises v. Long" on Justia Law

The Arizona Department of Weights and Measures fined AutoZone, Inc. for violating the Pricing Act, which prohibits mispricing and requires a seller to display prices on merchandise or at the point of display. The State later sued AutoZone alleging that, by violating the Pricing Act, AutoZone had also violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of AutoZone. The court of appeals vacated the superior court and remanded, holding that because the Pricing Act imposes a statutory duty to price items, any failure to do was not an omission but an "act," and was thus governed by the CFA's Act Clause, which imposes strict liability for not pricing goods as required by the Pricing Act. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that neither side was entitled to summary judgment; (2) the CFA does not authorize disgorgement to the State; and (3) the court of appeals erred in awarding the State interlocutory attorney's fees. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

Capital One retained a collection agency, which sent plaintiff, its debtor, a dunning letter with notice of her debt validation rights. Plaintiff claims that the content as a whole over-shadowed the debt validation notice, violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692g. The district court dismissed, stating that language like "act now" is only puffery and that placement of the notice on the back of the letter complies with the Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's rejection of a request to conduct a consumer survey to prove that the letter was confusing. View "Zemeckis v. Global Credit Collection Corp." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, curtails use of automated dialers and prerecorded messages to cell phones, whose subscribers often are billed for the call. AT&T hired a bill collector to call cell phone numbers at which customers had agreed to receive calls. The collection agency used a predictive dialer that works autonomously until a human voice answers. Predictive dialers continue to call numbers that no longer belong to the customers and have been reassigned to individuals who had not contracted with AT&T. The district court certified a class of individuals receiving automated calls after the numbers were reassigned and held that only consent of the subscriber assigned the number at the time of the call justifies an automated or recorded call. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Before a New Mexico law making it easier for identity theft victims to expunge negative information from their credit reports took effect, the Consumer Data Industry Association (CDIA) brought a pre-enforcement challenge, contending that the law was preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The CDIA sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the New Mexico Attorney General, who with aggrieved consumers, had the authority to enforce the law through a civil lawsuit. Upon review, the federal district court concluded that equitable relief against the Attorney General would not adequately redress CDIA's injuries, the district court dismissed the case as non-justiciable. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Consumer Data Industry v. King" on Justia Law