Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered whether the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), an act that governs the disposition of failed financial institutions' assets, divests a court of jurisdiction to consider any defense or affirmative defense not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process. The Supreme Court concluded that while FIRREA's jurisdictional bar divests a district court of jurisdiction to consider claims and counterclaims asserted against a successor in interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) not first adjudicated through FIRREA's claims process, it does not apply to defenses or affirmative defenses raised by a debtor in response to the successor in interest's complaint for collection. In this case, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Successor in Interest on its breach of contract and breach of personal guaranty claims against Debtor, as Debtor's affirmative defenses were not barred by FIRREA. Remanded. View "Schettler v. RalRon Capital Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claim that Deutsche and others violated various consumer protection laws in connection with a mortgage plaintiffs secured on their home. Plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to relief on account of violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667(f), and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 1026; North Carolina usury law, N.C. Gen. State 24; the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NCUDTPA), N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1; and North Carolina's Prohibited Acts by Debt Collectors statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-50. Plaintiffs also claimed a breach of contract and that Deutsche lacked the authority to enforce the loan. The court held that plaintiffs' TILA claim was not time-barred; plaintiffs adequately pled the elements of their usury claim and the claim was ripe for adjudication; similarly, plaintiffs' NCUDTPA claims should also be allowed to proceed; res judicata no longer barred plaintiffs from litigating whether Deutsche had authority to enforce the note; and plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in denying their motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59(e) was moot. View "Gilbert, Jr., et al. v. Residential Funding LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs defaulted on a loan that they had secured by giving the lender a mortgage on their property. A law firm representing the lender sent plaintiffs a letter and documents demanding payment of the debt and threatening to foreclose on the property if they did not pay it. Plaintiffs then filed a putative class action lawsuit against the law firm alleging that the communication violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that the complaint contained enough factual content to allow inference that the law firm was a "debt collector" because it regularly attempted to collect debts. The complaint also alleged that the law firm was "engaged in the business of collecting debts owed to others incurred for personal, family[,] or household purposes" and that in the year before the complaint was filed, the firm had sent more than 500 people "dunning notice[s]" containing "the same or substantially similar language" to that found in the letter and documents attached to the complaint in this case. Further, the complaint alleged enough to constitute regular debt collection within the meaning of 1692a(6). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reese, et al. v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree, & Adams, LLP" on Justia Law

This case involved a long-standing dispute between Appellants, the Tomes Landing Condominium Association and MRA Property Management, and Appellees, twenty-five condominium unit purchasers. The unit purchasers were granted partial summary judgment in the amount of one million dollars against MRA and the Association on the ground that the operating budget that MRA and the Association supplied as part of a "resale package" provided to the unit purchasers violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Act) because the budgets had the effect of misleading the unit purchasers in connection with their purchases of the condominiums. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the etnry of summary judgment was inappropriate, as (1) the Act could apply to disclosures made in a resale certificate by a condominium association and its management company during the sale of a condominium; and (2) there existed a dispute of material facts as to whether the operating budgets provided by MRA and the Association to the unit purchasers constituted unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Act. View "MRA Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from litigation between a homeowner, its insurer, and the company hired to restore the home after a series of storms caused damage to the home. A jury found in the restoration company's favor and the trial court rendered judgment against the homeowner and its insurer, jointly and severally. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the homeowner's state Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com Code 17.50, claim because the homeowner was not a prevailing party and he was not a entitled to an order restoring all amounts paid under the contracts without deducting the value received under those agreements. The court also affirmed the restoration company's charge error complaint. The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment as to the insurer where the insurer received direct consideration for its promise to pay for the dehumidification and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for that court to consider the insurer's remaining arguments, which included challenges to the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury findings. View "Dr. Erwin Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Corey McMillan, individually and on behalf of a purported class, filed a complaint against Live Nation Entertainment and Ticketmaster (collectively Ticketmaster), alleging that Ticketmaster charged fees in excess of the printed ticket price to musical or entertainment events in Arkansas and asserting that the additional charges violated Ark. Code Ann. 5-63-201(a)(1)(B), which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation, firm, or partnership to offer for sale any ticket to any music entertainment event at a greater price than that printed on the ticket or the advertised price of the ticket. The Arkansas Supreme Court accepted certification from the U.S. district court to answer a question of Arkansas law and held that section 5-63-201 by its plain and unambiguous language applies to a person, corporation, firm, or partnership and does not exclude exclusive ticket agents of public facilities who sell music entertainment tickets that include in the price of the ticket additional fees, resulting in the price of the ticket being more than the face value and advertised price of the ticket. View "McMillan v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Poulin Auto Sales appealed a trial court judgment that awarded attorney's fees under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (VCFA). Poulin argued that the court erred in holding it liable under the VCFA and refusing to reconsider evidence that a vehicle was sold "as is." In September 2006, Poulin purchased a 2001 Audi for $4800 at auction, where it received a clean document of title and an odometer disclosure form. Poulin brought the car to auction in January 2007 and sold it to Plaintiff Crawford Gregory. Plaintiff received a clean document of title, and Poulin certified that the odometer reading was correct at the time of sale. At resale, however, the odometer reading did not reflect the car’s actual mileage, the passenger side airbag was inoperable, and the title documents did not reflect the fact that the vehicle was previously salvaged and rebuilt. Plaintiff filed suit, and the trial court granted his motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for further findings on liability under the VCFA. On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment on the consumer fraud claim. After making further findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. In so doing, the court stated that it relied in part on the prior pleadings filed by the parties at the time of Plaintiff's original motion for summary judgment, filed in 2008, in addition to the parties' statements of undisputed facts in support of Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary judgment and Poulin's new cross-motion for summary judgment filed after remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that certain proffered documents were not before the trial court at either the pre- or post-remand summary judgment stages because Poulin did not attach them to either its 2008 or 2010 pleadings. Only later, when Poulin filed a motion to reconsider, were the documents attached. The court's refusal to reconsider this evidence was not an abuse of discretion, "for it was not the court's mistake that Poulin sought to correct - the court properly noted that Poulin had moved for summary judgment and could have submitted additional documents with the pleadings." View "Gregory v. Poulin Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging that Chase failed to comply with its obligations under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) by declining to issue him a permanent loan modification. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that HAMP did not provide a private cause of action and that, even if his claims were independent of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. The court applied the factors under Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Inves. to Hamp and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), 12 U.S.C. 5201-5261, holding that there was no implied right of action. Therefore, plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claims. To the extent plaintiff's claims fell outside of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. Rejecting plaintiff's remaining claim of promissory estoppel, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g), requires that electronically printed receipts not display more than the last 5 digits of the card number, but does not define "card number." A Shell card designates nine digits as the "account number" and five as the "card number" and has 14 digits embossed on the front and 18 digits encoded on the magnetic stripe. Shell printed receipts at its gas pumps with the last four digits of the account number. Plaintiffs contend that it should have printed the final four numbers that are electronically encoded on the magnetic stripe, which the industry calls the "primary account number." Plaintiffs did not claim risk of identity theft or any actual injury, but sought a penalty of $100 per card user for willful failure to comply. The district court denied Shell summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Shell did not willfully violate the Act.View "Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Van Straaten" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over certain property subject to a foreclosure. At issue was whether the parol evidence rule required that a person who claimed to hold a "purchase money mortgage" must prove his purchase money mortgage holder status solely by reference to the mortgage instrument itself. The court concluded that, in this case, the recorded deed and purchase money mortgage established that the sellers' mortgage satisfied, at least prima facie, all three requirements of 25 Del. C. 2108. Moreover, the mortgage contained no subordination language that would relinquish priority to the third party lenders. Therefore, the presumption that the sellers' mortgage was a purchase money mortgage entitled to statutory priority standards stood unrebutted. By applying the parol evidence rule to reach a contrary conclusion, the Superior Court erred as a matter of law. View "Galantino v. Baffone" on Justia Law