Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Wells Fargo Bank, NA (the Bank) filed a complaint for foreclosure against David and Lee Anne deBree, alleging that the deBrees were in default of a mortgage note owned by the Bank. The complaint also alleged that the Bank was a successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. The deBrees denied they were in default and denied the allegation that the Bank was successor to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank. At issue on appeal was an affidavit submitted by the Bank in favor of its motion that showed the rights on the note and mortgage were transferred not to Wells Fargo Bank, NA, but rather to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded, holding that the Bank failed to offer evidence that it owned the deBrees' mortgage and note, and therefore, it failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. deBree" on Justia Law

Lewis Hatch signed a promissory note to an institution later renamed to The Bank of Maine. Although Lewis alone signed the note, both Lewis and Kathleen Hatch secured it by mortgaging undeveloped land. The Bank subsequently filed a foreclosure complaint, and later filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of its motion, the Bank relied on an affidavit of its own employee. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Bank. The Hatches appealed, challenging the foundation presented by the Bank to support the admissibility of its mortgage records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that court did not abuse its discretion in considering the evidence, as the affidavit was sufficient to support the foundational facts required for the admissibility of the Bank's business records. View "The Bank of Maine v. Hatch" on Justia Law

Skydive Arizona sued SKYRIDE for false advertising, trademark infringement, and cybersquatting. SKYRIDE subsequently appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment, the jury's actual damages and profits awards, and the district court's damages enhancement. Skydive Arizona cross-appealed the district court's limitation of the permanent injunction to Skydive Arizona, and sought a nationwide injunction against SKYRIDE. The court reversed with regard to the district court's doubling of actual damages, and reinstated the jury's original actual damages award for false advertising, and for trademark infringement. The court affirmed the district court on all other claims. Thus, as modified in actual damages for false advertising, $2.5 million in actual damages for trademark infringement, $2,500,004 in lost profits for trademark infringement, and $600,000 in statutory damages for cybersquatting. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and modified in part. View "Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrochi, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants, ICC and Charles D. Hendrickson, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on her claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the district court's orders granting three of plaintiff's post-summary judgment motions. The court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment under Rule 56 where the district court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact but that ICC had violated the FDCPA and that Hendrickson was personally liable as ICC's sole owner, officer, and director because he qualified as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA. The notice of appeal was untimely filed as to the latter three post-summary judgment orders and were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cruz v. Int'l Collection Corp., et al." on Justia Law

The brokerage entered into agreements with customers that set a fee for handling, postage, and insurance for mailing confirmation slips after each securities trade. Plaintiff filed claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking class certification and recovery of fees charged since 1998. The brokerage removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), or the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) and (c) and 78bb(f), and obtained dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that SLUSA did not apply because any alleged misrepresentation was not material to decisions to buy or sell securities, but CAFA's general jurisdictional requirements were met. The agreement did not suggest that the fee represents actual costs, and it was not reasonable to read this into the agreement. Nor did the brokerage have an implied duty under New York law to charge a fee reasonably proportionate to actual costs where it notified customers in advance and they were free to decide whether to continue their accounts. View "Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Scottie and Dawn Pederson (the Pedersons) and Rocky Mountain Bank (the Bank) entered into a construction loan agreement pursuant to which the Bank agreed to lend the Pedersons several thousand dollars. In 2008, the Pedersons and the Bank agreed to finance the construction loan through three short term loans. In 2009, the Pedersons tried to refinance their loans but were unable to do so. Due to alleged failures on the part of the Bank, the Pedersons brought suit against the Bank in 2011, asserting claims for, inter alia, negligence, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. After it was served with the complaint, the Bank filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting the statutes of limitations had run on all of the Pedersons' claims. The district court granted the Bank's motion and dismissed the Pedersons' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the applicable statutes of limitations began to run in 2008 because the Pedersons' claims had accrued and they had discovered the facts constituting the claims; and (2) by filing their complaint more than three years later, the Pedersons failed to commence their action within any of the applicable statutes of limitations. View "Pederson v. Rocky Mountain Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against KeyBank, alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, in connection with private student loans that KeyBank extended to plaintiffs. The court concluded that (1) the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted the Broughton-Cruz rule and (2) the arbitration clause in the parties' contracts must be enforced because it was not unconscionable. Therefore, the court did not reach the question, presented in Appeal No. 10-15934, whether the NBA and the regulations of the OCC preempted plaintiffs' UCL claims. Accordingly, in Interlocutory Appeal No. 09-16703, the court reversed the district court's denial of KeyBank's motion to compel arbitration, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order staying the case and compelling arbitration. Because the disposition of that appeal rendered the district court's subsequent dismissal order a nullity, the court dismissed Appeal No. 10-15934 as moot. View "Kilgore, et al. v. Keybank, et al." on Justia Law

In 2009, lender issued plaintiff a four-month trial loan modification, under which it agreed to permanently modify the loan if she qualified under Home Affordable Mortgage Program guidelines, implemented by the Department of the Treasury to help homeowners avoid foreclosure during the decline in the housing market. Plaintiff filed a putative class action, claiming that she did qualify and that lender refused to grant her a permanent modification. She alleged violations of Illinois law under common-law contract and tort theories and under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The district court dismissed, finding that HAMP does not confer a private federal right of enforcement action on borrowers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff stated viable claims under Illinois law for breach of contract or promissory estoppel, fraud, and unfair or deceptive business practices. Claims of negligent misrepresentation or concealment were not viable. HAMP and its enabling statute (12 U.S.C. 5219(a)) do not contain a federal right of action, but neither do they preempt otherwise viable state claims. View "Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Borrower brought suit against a payday loan company (Company), arguing that its arbitration agreement containing a class waiver was unenforceable. The trial court found that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable because its class waiver deprived borrowers of a meaningful remedy. The Supreme Court reversed in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, holding that that the trial court erred in finding that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable based on its class waiver and should have instead adjudicated whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable in light of Borrower's evidence relevant to her claims regarding ordinary state-law principles that govern contracts but that do no single out or disfavor arbitration. Remanded. View "Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc." on Justia Law

After My Truong's home was foreclosed on, a trustee's sale was held, and Fannie Mae purchased Truong's home. Despite the sale, Truong continued to maintain possession of his home. Fannie Mae filed a petition for unlawful detainer. The circuit court granted Fannie Mae's motion for summary judgment and awarded Fannie Mae $6,000 in damages. Truong appealed, challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 534.010, among other things. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that Truong's failure to apply for a trial de novo pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 512.180.1, prior to seeking relief in the Supreme Court, deprived the Court of the authority to adjudicate his claims. View "Fannie Mae v. Truong" on Justia Law