Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Borrower brought suit against a payday loan company (Company), arguing that its arbitration agreement containing a class waiver was unenforceable. The trial court found that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable because its class waiver deprived borrowers of a meaningful remedy. The Supreme Court reversed in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, holding that that the trial court erred in finding that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable based on its class waiver and should have instead adjudicated whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable in light of Borrower's evidence relevant to her claims regarding ordinary state-law principles that govern contracts but that do no single out or disfavor arbitration. Remanded. View "Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc." on Justia Law

After My Truong's home was foreclosed on, a trustee's sale was held, and Fannie Mae purchased Truong's home. Despite the sale, Truong continued to maintain possession of his home. Fannie Mae filed a petition for unlawful detainer. The circuit court granted Fannie Mae's motion for summary judgment and awarded Fannie Mae $6,000 in damages. Truong appealed, challenging the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 534.010, among other things. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that Truong's failure to apply for a trial de novo pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 512.180.1, prior to seeking relief in the Supreme Court, deprived the Court of the authority to adjudicate his claims. View "Fannie Mae v. Truong" on Justia Law

Insured appealed the circuit court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to Broker on Insured's claims that Broker violated a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Insured by not disclosing that Broker received contingent commissions from Insurers for directing Insured's business to them and that Broker kept all interest earned on the premiums Insured sent it between the time Broker received them and the time they were forwarded to the Insurers. In addition, Insured argued that Broker breached a duty to find it the least costly policy possible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) brokers do not have a duty to find insureds the lowest possible cost insurance available to meet their needs; (2) Missouri law specifically authorizes a broker to receive commissions from the insurer and to deposit premiums in an account pending their payment to the insurer or refund to the insured; but (3) the trial court erred by dismissing the petition because it could not be said as a matter of law that Emerson could not recover on one or more of its claims. Remanded. View "Emerson Elec. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos." on Justia Law

Fifty-four individuals and business entities sued Appellants-Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Poultry, Inc., and Russell Adams (collectively, Tyson), in association with contracts under which they were to raise chickens owned by Tyson on feed supplied by the company. Tyson moved to sever the claims for separate trials. The trial judge denied the motion, allowing the plaintiffs to select eleven individuals and entities to proceed to trial under theories of violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and fraud. The poultry growers contended that Tyson targeted them for failure by delivering unhealthy birds and feed in retaliation for their refusal to modernize operations. The jury, in a nine to three split, awarded the growers compensatory and punitive damages approaching $10 million. Alleging evidentiary errors and juror misconduct, Tyson filed a motion for new trial. The trial judge recused and the new trial motion was heard by an assigned judge. Acknowledging concerns about the conduct of the trial, the substitute judge denied the motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, staying further proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: 1) where attorneys were advised that voir dire would be limited to questions not covered in the juror questionnaire and jurors gave incomplete, untruthful, and/or misleading answers in those documents, Appellants were entitled to a new trial; and 2) a poultry grower having no title to the chickens or feed placed with the grower for fattening and future marketing of the birds by the flock's owner is not an "aggrieved consumer" for purposes of the Consumer Protection Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "James v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Synapse provides customers with promotional rate or free magazine subscriptions, obtains their credit card information, and, when the promotion expires, provides notice, then bills a subscription to the credit card, if the customer does not cancel. Former customers claimed that the automatic renewal notices amounted to a deceptive business practice. The district court denied certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class. The Third Circuit affirmed. None of the plaintiffs are current Synapse customers, so they lack standing to seek the remedy they are pursuing on behalf of the class. View "McNair v. Synapse Grp., Inc" on Justia Law

Redbox rents DVDs, Blu-ray discs, and video games from automated retail kiosks and was sued under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court held that Act provisions requiring destruction of records containing personally identifiable information can be enforced by suit for damages. After deciding to accept the interlocutory appeal because it will materially advance the ultimate termination of the class action, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court noted the placement of the damages remedy in the statute, after description of a prohibitions on knowing disclosure of personally identifiable information, but before prohibition on use of such information before tribunals or the record-destruction mandate. The court also noted the "unsuitability" of those provisions to damage awards.View "Redbox Automated Retail, LLC v. Sterk" on Justia Law

In April and June of 2008, Best of the Best Auto Sales, Inc. purchased seven vehicles from Dealers Auto Auction of Idaho and Brasher's Idaho Auto Auction with checks that were returned for insufficient funds. As a result, Dealers and Brasher refused to provide Best of the Best with the titles to the vehicles. Best of the Best then sold the vehicles to Idaho consumers without providing them with titles. Dealers and Brasher filed claims with CNA Surety d/b/a Western Surety Company which acted as a surety for a "$20,000 Vehicle/Vessel Dealer Bond." Best of the Best was the principal. Upon Best of the Best's failure to provide evidence or defenses for Dealers' and Brasher's claims, Western Surety alleged that it lawfully settled those claims in good faith upon the condition that the consumers received their titles, even though they were not based on final judgments. Plaintiff Nick Hestead submitted his claim, which was based on a final judgment. Plaintiff's claim involved fraud and fraudulent representation concerning a separate vehicle that he purchased from Best of the Best that was previously branded a lemon in California. Western Surety responded by asserting that the Dealer Bond was exhausted. Plaintiff contended that the plain meaning of I.C. 49-1610(4) provides that his claim should be given priority because it was submitted thirty days after a final judgment was entered, unlike Dealers' and Brasher's claims. Western Surety asserted that the plain meaning of I.C. 41-1839(3) permits sureties to settle Dealer Bond claims in good faith. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the payments on the surety bond were lawfully made in good faith pursuant to I.C. 49-1610(1) and I.C. 41-1839(3) because Dealers' and Brasher's claims were undisputed and supported by competent evidence. View "Hestead v. CNA Supply dba Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellant Bridge Tower Dental hired Respondent Meridian Computer Center to provide its dental practice with a computer hardware system subject to a warranty contract. In June of 2005, Bridge began experiencing problems with its server. Bridge Tower Dental entrusted its computer server, including both of its hard drives, to Meridian in order to repair or restore the failing hard drive. While attempting to restore the failing hard drive, Respondent mistakenly confused the source and destination locations on the motherboard and inadvertently erased all of Bridge's data, including the practice's patient records, from the working hard drive. Bridge filed suit against Meridian for breach of contract and negligence under the law of bailment. At trial, the district court denied Bridge's request to submit different jury instructions for the separate claims, and instead combined the contract claim with the negligent bailment claim in the final jury instructions. The jury entered a general verdict in favor of Meridian. Bridge filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or alternatively, a Motion for New Trial, both of which were denied by the district court. The court entered an order awarding attorney's fees and costs to Meridian. Bridge appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the district court erred in denying its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict because Meridian failed to prove that it was not negligent in erasing the data contained on the working hard drive, that the court erred in denying the Motion for New Trial because the jury instructions were improper, and that the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of Bridge's post-trial motion and vacated the lower court's award of attorney's fees because Meridian was no longer the prevailing party. View "Bridge Tower Dental, P.A. v. Meridian Computer Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants in Missouri state court, on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated borrowers, alleging that defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mo. Rev. State 484.020 when they charged certain fees in the course of refinancing plaintiff's mortgage. Defendants moved the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d) and plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that she was charged any fees, directly or indirectly, for legal work performed by non-lawyers. Therefore, plaintiff had not shown injury and did not have standing to bring her claim. In light of plaintiff's lack of standing, the district court should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction rather than reaching the merits of the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The State of Nevada filed a parens patriae lawsuit against Bank of America in Clark County District Court, alleging that the Bank misled Nevada consumers about the terms and operation of its home mortgage modification and foreclosure processes, in violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 598.0903-.0999. Nevada also alleged that the Bank violated an existing consent judgment in a prior case between Nevada and several of the Bank's subsidiaries, entered in Clark County District Court. The Bank removed the action to federal district court, asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction as either a "class action" or "mass action" under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), and as arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. 1331. Denying Nevada's motion to remand, the federal district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the action as a CAFA "class action," but not as a "mass action," and that it also had federal question jurisdiction because resolving the state claims would require an interpretation of federal law. The court concluded that because parens patriae actions were not removable under CAFA, and the action did not otherwise satisfy CAFA's "mass action" requirements, the district court lacked jurisdiction under CAFA. The court also exercised its interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c) to review the district court's determination that it had federal question jurisdiction because the complaint referenced the federal Home Affordable Mortgage Program and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCP), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The court concluded that the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction. Because there was no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the case was remanded to Nevada state court. View "State of Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., et al." on Justia Law