Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their second amended complaint alleging that HP concealed a design defect in its Pavilion Notebook computers that manifested after the expiration of the warranty and created an unreasonable safety hazard in violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750 et seq., and Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq. The court found that the district court did not err in requiring plaintiffs to allege the existence of an unreasonable safety defect and that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the existence of an unreasonably safety defect or HP's knowledge of a defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wilson, et al. v. Hewlett-Packard Co." on Justia Law

Heritage Bank sued Jerome Bruha on promissory notes that it had purchased from the FDIC. The FDIC had obtained the notes after it became a receiver for the failed bank that had initially lent the money to Bruha. The notes secured lines of credit for Bruha's benefit. The district court granted summary judgment to Heritage and awarded it $61,384 on one of the notes. The primary issues on appeal were whether the holder-in-due-course rule of Nebraska's Uniform Commercial Code or federal banking law barred Bruha's defenses to the enforcement of the note. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed in part, concluding that federal law barred Bruha's defenses; and (2) reversed in part because of a minor error in the court's calculation of interest. Remanded. View "Heritage Bank v. Bruha" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal from the superior court that partially granted and partially denied the summary judgment motion filed by Defendants Lakes Region Water Company and Thomas Mason (collectively LRWC). The question before the Court was whether the superior court erred in concluding that Defendants were not exempt from the Consumer Protection Act to the extent that they allegedly misrepresented that the water they provided was safe for use and consumption. Answering in the affirmative, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of partial summary judgment as to the claims of the plaintiffs Jo Anne Rainville, Carl Beher, Lisa Mullins d/b/a The Olde Village Store, and approximately fifty others, under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) which sought damages for alleged misrepresentations about the quality of water provided. View "Rainville v. Lakes Region Water Company, Inc." on Justia Law

John and Paul Pelletier formed St. Sauveur Development in the 1970s and transferred title of several jointly-owned properties to the corporation. In 2002, an appraiser appraised the corporation's property holdings. After the appraisal, the brothers agreed to divide the properties and how they would be divided, with the understanding that John would make a cash payment to Paul to equalize the division. In 2004, John began making payments to Paul. In 2005, the brothers received an analysis from Paul's accountant that they agreed on the actual amount of Paul's payment and to the payment terms, including the interest rate. Paul subsequently filed a complaint for dissolution and other relief. The business and consumer docket determined and divided John's and Paul's interests in St. Sauveur, concluding that the parties had entered into an enforceable agreement in 2002. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) the agreement regarding interest was reached in 2005, and therefore, the court's determination that interest should accrue from the date of the 2002 appraisal was error; and (2) the court did not err in failing to find that a check from St. Sauveur that Paul negotiated in 2009 gave rise to an accord and satisfaction. Remanded. View "Pelletier v. Pelletier" on Justia Law

Appellant Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Associates (CTSA) appealed an order of the circuit court granting summary judgment against CTSA and finding that CTSA's lien was second in priority to Appellee Metropolitan National Bank's lien on certain property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that there was not a final order in this case nor was there an Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification. The Court concluded (1) it was impossible for the Court to determine if all claims and parties pertaining to the complaint had been settled; (2) the record contained no final disposition as to Metropolitan's claims against two individual defendants; and (3) The status of CTSA's breach-of-contract claims against individual defendants and its monetary-judgment claim against another party was unclear. View "Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Assocs. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought rescission of her loan secured by a trust deed with the Bank for alleged violations of disclosure requirements under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because it was filed after the three-year period set by 15 U.S.C. 1635(f). Plaintiff argued that because she gave the Bank timely notice of rescission, she was not required to bring suit within the three-year period, and the district court erred in dismissing the case. The court held that, under the court's precedent and Supreme Court precedent, the time limit established by section 1635(f) was applicable here. Moreover, as explained in Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., section 1635(f) was a three-year statute of repose, requiring dismissal of a claim for rescission brought more than three years after the consummation of the loan secured by the first trust deed, regardless of when the borrower sent notice of rescission. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans" on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiffs contracted with defendant to purchase a condominium for $395,900. They made cash deposits of $11,877 and executed a note for $19,795. When notified of a closing date in 2009, plaintiffs' counsel sent defendant a letter rescinding the agreement and requesting return of the deposits. Defendant declined. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1701, for failing to provide a printed property report, and failure to include a provision notifying plaintiffs that if defendant failed to furnish a property report before execution of the purchase agreement, they had the right to revoke the purchase agreement within two years of its signing. They also asserted a claim under the Michigan Condominium Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 559.184. The district court held that the claim for rescission was untimely, stating that a purchaser must notify the seller of rescission within two years after the signing, but a has an additional third year to bring suit if the seller refused to honor the rescission. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the claim for automatic rescission was untimely, but reversed dismissal of the state law claim and remanded. Equitable rescission may be available under 15 U.S.C. 1709. View "Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C," on Justia Law

Max and Glenna Overbey recovered judgments against Chad Franklin National Auto Sales North, LLC (National) and Chad Franklin (Franklin) for fraudulent representations in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act made in connection with National's sale of a vehicle to the Overbeys. Franklin appealed, and the Overbeys appealed the trial court's reduction of the punitive damage verdict as required by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the award against Franklin was fully supported by the evidence; and (2) the limit of punitive damages did not violate the Overbeys' constitutional rights or the separation of powers doctrine. View "Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat'l Auto Sales N., LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the judicial sale of a condominium owned by Petitioner and conducted by two court-appointed trustees that were employed by a law firm (collectively, Respondents). Following the sale, Petitioner filed a complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty involving actual fraud and breach of fiduciary duty involving constructive fraud by the trustees and alleging vicarious liability by the law firm. The trial judge granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that Respondents were entitled to qualified judicial immunity for their actions in connection with the sale. The court of special appeals (1) reversed with regard to Petitioner's allegations of actual fraud, and (2) affirmed with regard to the other causes of action on grounds of qualified judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Respondents were not entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and the concept of qualified public official immunity was inapplicable to the circumstances of this case. View "D'Aoust v. Diamond" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered whether the clerk of superior court had the authority to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees that a trustee-attorney in a foreclosure proceeding paid to himself in addition to his trustee's commission. The superior court affirmed the clerk's order. The court of appeals vacated the clerk's and trial court's orders, holding that the clerk lacked the statutory authority to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees paid in a foreclosure proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the clerk exceeded his statutory authority by reducing the trustee-attorney's attorney's fees, and (2) absent a viable challenge for breach of fiduciary duty from a creditor with standing, the trustee-attorney's payment of attorney's fees to himself in addition to a trustee's commission could not be upset. View "In re Foreclosure of Vogler Realty, Inc." on Justia Law