Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, David and Barbara Smith, asserted various claims arising out of the construction of their home against Defendants, Donald L. Mattia, Inc. (DLM), Donald Mattia, and Barbara Joseph (Barbara). The Chancery Court (1) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and (ii) Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim; (2) denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' claim for misappropriation of Plaintiffs' backfill and money paid to DLM that was not applied to their project and (ii) Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to purchase excess lumber and misappropriated $8,836 in connection with the purchase of excess lumber; (2) granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, as Defendants did not articulate a viable cause of action in their counterclaim; and (3) denied Barbara's motion for Chan. Ct. R. 11 sanctions where there was no evidence that Plaintiffs' attorney did not have a good faith belief in the legitimacy of the claims asserted against Barbara. View "Smith v. Donald L. Mattia, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned the distribution of surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale of property encumbered by multiple successive mortgages obtained through fraud. Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of Defendant First American Title Insurance Company and ordering that the remaining proceeds of a foreclosure sale be distributed to First American. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly granted First American's motion to intervene in the action, (2) the trial court applied a proper standard of review in granting relief pursuant to First American's motion to reargue the trial court's decision determining the priorities of the parties; and (3) the trial court's conclusion that First American was entitled to receive all of the remaining funds from the foreclosure sale could be upheld on the alternate ground that, because First American's mortgage was recorded prior in time to Stewart Title's mortgage, it was entitled to all of the surplus proceeds on deposit pursuant to the first in time, first in right rule. View "Hudson Valley Bank v. Kissel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated this case with "Walker v. Guiffre" because it implicated the state's fee-shifting statutes. The Appellate Division found that the trial court's analysis of the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rate in "Walker" did not satisfy the analysis found in "Rendine v. Pantzer" (141 N.J. 292 (1995)). The Supreme Court considered whether the "Rendine" framework had been altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Perdue v. Kenny A." (130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010)). The Court concluded that the mechanism for awarding attorneys' fees (including contingency enhancements) as adopted in "Rendine" remain in full force and effect as the governing principles for awards made pursuant to New Jersey fee-shifting statutes. View "Humphries v. Powder Mill Shopping Plaza" on Justia Law

Plaintiff May Walker alleged that Defendant Carmelo Guiffre violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). After finding that Defendant violated the CFA and TCCWNA, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a fee award. The trial court fixed the lodestar amount and applied a forty-five percent contingency enhancement. The Appellate Division found that the trial court's analysis of the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rate, based only on the judge's personal experience, did not satisfy the analysis found in "Rendine v. Pantzer" (141 N.J. 292 (1995)). In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the "Rendine" framework had been altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Perdue v. Kenny A. (130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010)). The Court concluded that the mechanism for awarding attorneys' fees (including contingency enhancements) as adopted in "Rendine" remain in full force and effect as the governing principles for awards made pursuant to New Jersey fee-shifting statutes. View "Walker v. Guiffre" on Justia Law

Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant, alleging the nonpayment of goods totaling $713,970. Appellant did not answer the complaint, and the circuit court entered a default judgment awarding the amount alleged in the complaint, plus interest and costs. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to set aside default judgment and dismiss the case, contending that the summons did not bear a valid signature of the clerk as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and that the default judgment must be set aside as void under Ark. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The circuit court refused to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly found that the summons here was indeed valid. View "Unimeks LLC v. Purolite" on Justia Law

Verizon Maryland, a telecommunications company, and the staff of the Public Service Commission (PSC) obtained PSC approval of a global settlement of six pending cases. Verizon employed an alternative form of regulation (AFOR) under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Co. (PUC) 4-301 that included up to $6,000,000 in bill credits to customers with out-of-service complaints that were not resolved in compliance with specified standards. PSC approved the AFOR pursuant to PUC 4-301. A technicians union objected, contending that the service quality aspects of the AFOR did not ensure the quality, availability, and reliability of service required by PUC 4-301. The circuit court affirmed PSC's approval of the AFOR. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PSC acted within its discretion in approving the AFOR, as PUC 4-301's use of the term "ensuring" did not require that PSC be completely certain that Verizon's incentive strategy would result in compliance with standards. View "Commc'ns Workers of Am., ALF-CIO v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Vernon was a homeowner in default on his home loan. ReconTrust, the holder of Plaintiff's deed of trust, initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on the deed. Upon receiving notice of the trustee's sale, Plaintiff sued ReconTrust, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and Bank of New York Mellon. He alleged that none of the defendants had standing to initiate the foreclosure. Bank of New York moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the claims that it complied with the statutory requirements to foreclose, and that standing was not a requirement for nonjudicial foreclosures. The district court granted the motion, and Plaintiff appealed. He argued that before a party may initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure it must affirmatively show it has standing by having an interest to both the deed of trust and the promissory note. Finding that a trustee was not required to prove it had standing before foreclosing on a deed of trust, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. View "Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's holding that her common law tort claims against Medtronic were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), as interpreted by Riegel v. Medtronic. On appeal, plaintiff argued that because the device in question allegedly failed to operate in accordance with the terms of its premarket approval, her claims paralleled federal requirements and therefore should avoid preemption. Because the medical pump at issue was undisputedly designed, manufactured, and distributed in compliance with its FDA premarket approval, and plaintiff's common law claims exceeded or differed from, rather than paralleled, federal requirements, the court held that each of her specific claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty were preempted. View "Walker v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William and Donna Judson secured a default judgment against Wheeler RV Las Vegas on a complaint asserting breach of contract and misrepresentation claims arising out of the Judsons' purchase of a recreational vehicle from Wheeler. Wheeler sought to set aside the default judgment, asserting surprise or excusable neglect in its failure to answer the complaint, suggesting that Wheeler was the wrong party because its predecessor was the entity that sold the Judsons their RV, and questioning their district court's jurisdiction over Wheeler. The district court denied Wheeler's motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Wheeler failed to make a "clear and specific proffer" of a meritorious defense required as a predicate for setting aside a default judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the simple pleading standard set forth under Rule 60(b), Wheeler's meritorious defense allegations were sufficient. Remanded to resolve the issue of whether Wheeler established the "surprise and excusable neglect" predicate for setting aside the default judgment. View "Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

The claims in these consolidated cases were largely identical in that they shared similar allegations of violations of the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (SMLL), the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and common law breach of contract. Appellees in these cases were mortgage companies, who were assignees of the original lenders, and Appellants were individual borrowers. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissals of each of the cases by the circuit courts, holding (1) the SMLL does not restrict a lender to a single loan origination fee, as long as the aggregate fees charged and collected do not exceed the statutory maximum; (2) Appellees were not required by the SMLL to provide borrowers, who did not intend to use the proceeds of their secondary mortgage loans for commercial purposes, a disclosure form designed expressly to advise commercial borrowers only under the SMLL; and (3) certain Appellants failed to support sufficiently their allegations of breach of contract, CPA violations, and claims in accounting with specific facts. View "Polek v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law