Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

In the garnishment action below, Plaintiffs sought to collect the consent judgments they had previously obtained in settlement of their tort actions against Americold Corporation, which was insured by Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Company (NPIC). NPIC, the garnishee in the instant action, appealed the district court's adverse rulings, contending that the underlying judgments against Americold had become dormant and extinguished, thus depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with this garnishment action. Finding in favor of NPIC on that issue, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when the district court entered its judgment against NPIC in this garnishment proceeding, Plaintiffs' underlying consent judgments against Americold had been extinguished by operation of the dormancy and revivor statutes; (2) because Americold was not legally obligated to pay an unenforceable judgment, NPIC was no longer indebted to Americold under its contract to pay the judgments for which Americold was legally liable; and (3) accordingly, without an indebtedness from NPIC to Americold, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Plaintiffs judgment against NPIC in a garnishment proceeding. Remanded with directions to dismiss these garnishment proceedings. View "Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state common law tort claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the FCRA preempted plaintiff's state law claims against Chase. View "Macpherson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Arrow Financial Services filed a complaint against Sarah Guiliani alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Arrow then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to establish that Arrow owned a credit card account registered to Guiliani and that Guiliani owed an unpaid balance of $5044 on the account. In support of its motion, Arrow asserted in an affidavit that it was the assignee of Guiliani's credit card account with Washington Mutural. The district court granted Arrow's motion and awarded Arrow $3493, plus interest and court costs. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment, holding that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of Arrow because disputes remained as to material facts regarding the balance due on the account and its assignment to Arrow. View "Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC v. Guiliani" on Justia Law

In 2008 the city levied fines against plaintiff, arising from a parcel of real estate that he no longer owned. When he did not pay those fines, the city retained defendant to collect. The district court dismissed his suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p, finding that fines are not "debts" covered by the FDCPA. For purposes of the statute, a "debt" can arise only from a "transaction in which money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that fines cannot reasonably be understood as debts arising from consensual consumer transactions for goods and services. View "Gulley v. Markov & Krasny " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs paid off their home mortgage early and were charged a $30 "payoff statement fee" and a $14 "recording fee" in connection with the prepayment. They challenged the fees as violations of the mortgage contract, of state laws, and of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2601. The district court dismissed the suit as preempted by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. 1461, and for failure to state a claim under RESPA. The Sixth Circuit held that the other claims were properly dismissed, but remanded a breach of contract claim. A Michigan Usury Act claim was preempted by HOLA; plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the deed recording statute, the state consumer protection law, or RESPA, which does not apply to charges imposed after the settlement. The court rejected a claim by the FDIC, appointed as receiver for the defendant-lender, that the court had been deprived of jurisdiction by the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1281(d).View "Molosky v. Washington Mut., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Olivea Marx appealed a district court's judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee General Revenue Corporation (GRC). Plaintiff defaulted on her student loan. GRC was hired by her lender to collect on the account. Plaintiff sued GRC alleging abusive and threatening phone called in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court, after a one-day trial in May 2010, found that the challenged collection practices were not abusive and threatening given its view of what actually occurred. Plaintiff did not appeal these findings, instead she contested the court's conclusion that a fax sent to her employer asking about her employment status did not violate the FDCPA's provision against debt-collector communications with third parties. Finding that the district court did not error in its decision made in her case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the court's order. View "Marx v. General Revenue Corp." on Justia Law

Decedent, as CEO of Corporation, purchased a cell phone retail outlet from Creditor for which Creditor accepted a promissory note from Corporation. Decedent signed the note as personal guarantor but died before completing payments. Two related legal actions followed: a California civil suit and this Wyoming probate action. Creditor filed a breach of contract action in California and a timely claim with Decedent's Estate in the Wyoming action. Creditor, however, failed to bring suit within thirty days after the date the Estate mailed a notice of rejection of the claim as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 2-7-718. Creditor then added the Estate as a defendant in the California action. In Wyoming, the probate court ruled that Creditor had not complied with section 2-7-718, that the Estate was not added to the California lawsuit until after the filing window had closed, and that Creditor should not receive equitable relief from strict application of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it declined to provide Creditor equitable relief under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 2-7-703(c) from application of the statute of limitations found in section 2-7-718. View "In re Estate of Graves" on Justia Law

JLB Corporation, a mortgage brokering service, entered into an agreement with Bonnie Hargis to refinance her home. JLB then prepared Hargis's loan application and other financial disclosure documents. JLB alleged it played no role in drawing the note or deed of trust, which were prepared by third parties, and it did not charge for their preparation. Hargis, however, filed a three-count petition against JLB, alleging, inter alia, that JLB engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of JLB on all counts. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment to JLB as to the first two counts relating to the unauthorized practice of law where the record showed that JLB assisted Hargis only in preparing financial documents and did not show that JLB procured or assisted in the drawing of Hargis' note, deed of trust, or other legal documents; and (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment to JLB on the third count alleging unjust enrichment, as JLB's summary judgment motion failed to negate any element of Hargis' unjust enrichment claim. Remanded. View "Hargis v. JLB Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the Maryland insurance commissioner, issued a cease-and-desist order to Respondents, several premium finance companies that provided loans primarily to customers of the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, purporting to prevent them from charging interest on loans to consumers to pay automobile insurance premiums in excess of the statutory maximum. Respondents requested a hearing. An associate deputy insurance commissioner presided over a hearing at the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) and issued a final order affirming the commissioner's cease-and-desist order. The circuit court concluded that the administrative hearing violated Respondents' right to fundamental fairness and due process of law because the commissioner delegated the decision-making authority to a subordinate. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the court of special appeals and circuit court and affirmed for the most part the decision of the MIA, holding, inter alia, that (1) the MIA hearing was fair and without undue "command influence"; and (2) the commissioner's interpretation of Md. Code Ann. Ins. 23-304 was correct, and Respondents violated the statute when their premium finance agreements operated to assess a finance charge in excess of 1.15 percent for each of thirty days. View "Md. Ins. Comm'r v. Cent. Acceptance Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners defaulted on their refinanced home mortgage because of financial hardships. Faced with foreclosure, Petitioners initiated a request to enjoin the foreclosure action filed by Respondents. Respondents, the substitute trustees under the mortgage and Deutsche Bank, possessed and sought to enforce an under-indorsed mortgage note, which, prior to coming into their possession, was transferred three times intermediately, bundled with a multitude of other mortgages, securitized, lost, and then discovered before the ultimate evidentiary hearing leading to the foreclosure sale. The trial court denied injunctive relief to Petitioners, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondents were nonholders in possession and entitled to enforce the note and deed of trust through foreclosure. View "Anderson v. Burson" on Justia Law