Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff purchased travel arrangements through Expedia, Inc.'s ("Expedia") website and Expedia emailed him a receipt, which included the expiration date of his credit card. Plaintiff claimed that this email receipt violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA"), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., in part to combat identity theft. At issue was the meaning of the words "print" and "electronically printed" under FACTA, in connection with an email receipt. The court held that "print" referred to many different technologies, all of which involve the making of tangible impression on paper or other tangible medium. The court also held that a receipt, under FACTA that was transmitted to the consumer via email and then digitally displayed on the consumer's screen was not an "electronically printed" receipt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Petitioner sued the owners of her childhood home alleging injuries from lead paint on the premises. At issue was the trial court's instruction regarding the joint responsibilities of landlords and tenants in keeping the property in good condition. The court held that the inclusion of the instruction was error because neither plaintiff's contributory negligence nor negligence of her family members were at issue in the case. The court also held that the error was prejudicial because it introduced into the jury deliberations the idea that plaintiff, or her family, could have also been to blame for the injuries and such an argument was not only irrelevant to the case but prohibited by law and policy. The court further held that the inclusion of the argument could have permitted the jury to speculate or precluded a finding of liability where it was otherwise appropriate.

The State sued CVS Pharmacy, Inc. and five other pharmacies (collectively, "pharmacies") in state court alleging that they sold generic drugs to West Virginia consumers without passing along to the consumers the cost savings of generic drugs over brand name equivalents in violation of West Virginia Code 30-5-12b(g), which regulated the practice of pharmacy, and the West Virgina Consumer Credit Protection Act, West Virginia Code 46A-6-104. At issue was whether the district court properly ordered the case to be remanded to state court after the pharmacies removed the case from state court to the district court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), Pub. L. No. 109-2 Stat. 4. The court affirmed and held that the action was not a class action as defined by the CAFA where the action was not brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or West Virginia's corresponding rule but, rather, the action was brought under the West Virginia statute regulating the practice of pharmacy and the West Virgina Consumer Credit Protection Act, neither of which included provisions providing for a typical class action.

T-Mobile Central LLC ("T-Mobile") sued Missouri municipalities for refund of certain tax payments that it had paid under protest and filed ten separate lawsuits seeking to recoup tax payments made within ten specific time periods. Appellees brought ten separate class action suits against T-Mobile in state court for passing the contested tax onto customers and sought to recover any money that the Missouri municipalities refunded to T-Mobile. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(6), to remand the ten class actions to the state court from which they were removed. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that there was no indication that appellees artificially divided the lawsuit to avoid the CAFA where the structure of appellees' class actions exactly mirrored the underlying ten lawsuits brought by T-Mobile and were driven by T-Mobile's own litigation decisions.

Plaintiff sued defendant under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.51-.59, for his injuries that resulted from his firing a Remington Model 710 rifle ("rifle"). At issue was whether the district court erred in its findings regarding the bolt-assembly pin and its "reasonably-anticipated-use" finding. The court applied a highly deferential standard and held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that the bolt-assembly pin was not in the rifle when plaintiff fired it and suffered injuries from the uncontained explosion. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that defendant should not have expected the rifle to be fired after someone had removed, but failed to install, the bolt-assembly pin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of owners and lessors of 2007 model year and older Volkswagen and Audi vehicles, alleged that defendant, Volkswagen of America, Inc., limited the availability of replacement vehicle keys and failed to sufficiently disclose information about the potential difficulty and expense of obtaining such replacements. At issue was whether objector-appellant had Article III standing to appeal a settlement agreement between the parties. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and held that objector-appellant, who expressly disavowed any financial interest in the fee defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff's counsel, failed to demonstrate how he had suffered injury as a result of the fee order.

The first plaintiffs alleged that Fidelity failed to provide a discount, required by its filed rates, when issuing title insurance to homeowners who had purchased a title insurance policy for the same property from any other insurer within the previous 10 years. The second plaintiff brought the same claims against First American. The district court denied their motion to certify a class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the claims involve small amounts, so that the plaintiffs are likely unable to recover except by class action, the plaintiffs did not establish that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the whole class predominate over issues subject to individualized proof. The need to establish entitlement to join the class and the need to prove individual damages are not fatal to class certification, but the Ohio insurance rate structure would necessitate individual inquiries on the issue of liability. The plaintiffs phrased their claims in a way that would require examination of individual policies and whether the company received the requisite documentation for the discount.

Washington residents who were consumers of allegedly illegal debt adjustment programs filed a class action lawsuit against Defendants Global Client Solutions, LLC (GCS) and Rocky Mountain Bank and Trust (RMBT). Defendants managed and held âspecial purpose accountsâ as part of their adjustment programs. Payments to consumersâ creditors were authorized from these accounts. When enough money accumulated in a consumerâs account, Defendants would attempt to use the funds to negotiate settlement with creditors on terms favorable to the consumer. Defendants charged consumers various fees for its services. GCSâ earnings came from the fees they charged directly to the special purpose account holders. RMBT did not receive fees, but benefited by holding Plaintiffsâ money without paying interest. In 2009, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued a cease and desist order that required a reformation of RMBTâs banking practices. GCS subsequently stopped opening new accounts at RMBT. Later that year, Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against GCS and RMBT on behalf of all consumers who has special purpose accounts. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington certified three questions to the state Supreme Court regarding interpretation of state law in the Plaintiffsâ case. In response, the Supreme Court concluded that GCS is a âdebt adjusterâ and as such, is not exempt from liability under state law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that debt settlement companies that worked with GCS and RMBT are likely subject to the stateâs debt adjusting statute fee limits, depending on whether they are debt adjusters providing debt adjustment services.

The tenant appealed an eviction order. The appeals court reversed, finding that the management company had not given notice required by state law. One member of the state appellate panel opined that the company violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The tenant sought damages in federal court. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the management company is not a debt collector under the Act. The company is an agent of the building owner and "obtained" an interest a debt when it was given the right to collect the tenant's rent, before she fell behind on payments.

Defendant-Appellant Randall Peterson appealed the district court order that denied his motion for reconsideration of a judgment entered against him for credit card debt owed to Plaintiff-Appellee Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (Citibank). Citibank sued Defendant alleging he failed to pay his bill. Defendant filed what he called a âspecial appearanceâ only to ask that the complaint be dismissed. The district court denied Defendantâs motion to dismiss. Subsequently Defendant filed a letter he had sent to the lawyer disciplinary board to the district court. The district court eventually entered a default judgment in favor of Citibank, and ordered Defendant to pay his bill. On appeal, Defendant argued that the two documents (the âspecial appearanceâ and the letter to the disciplinary board) were âbrush offsâ by the court, and constituted an abuse of discretion by the court in entering the default against him. The Supreme Court noted many of the technical problems with Defendantâs submissions to the lower court. Even in his application for appeal, Defendant addressed no errors at the lower court, and raised no real issues for the Courtâs review. Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.