Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The tenant appealed an eviction order. The appeals court reversed, finding that the management company had not given notice required by state law. One member of the state appellate panel opined that the company violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The tenant sought damages in federal court. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the management company is not a debt collector under the Act. The company is an agent of the building owner and "obtained" an interest a debt when it was given the right to collect the tenant's rent, before she fell behind on payments.

Defendant-Appellant Randall Peterson appealed the district court order that denied his motion for reconsideration of a judgment entered against him for credit card debt owed to Plaintiff-Appellee Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (Citibank). Citibank sued Defendant alleging he failed to pay his bill. Defendant filed what he called a âspecial appearanceâ only to ask that the complaint be dismissed. The district court denied Defendantâs motion to dismiss. Subsequently Defendant filed a letter he had sent to the lawyer disciplinary board to the district court. The district court eventually entered a default judgment in favor of Citibank, and ordered Defendant to pay his bill. On appeal, Defendant argued that the two documents (the âspecial appearanceâ and the letter to the disciplinary board) were âbrush offsâ by the court, and constituted an abuse of discretion by the court in entering the default against him. The Supreme Court noted many of the technical problems with Defendantâs submissions to the lower court. Even in his application for appeal, Defendant addressed no errors at the lower court, and raised no real issues for the Courtâs review. Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against JP Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase") alleging violations of Fla. Stat. 655.85 and unjust enrichment where she was charged a fee to cash a check as a non-account holder at Chase. At issue was whether the district court properly granted Chase's motion to dismiss both plaintiff's claims as preempted by the National Bank Act ("NBA"), 12 U.S.C. 21 et seq. The court affirmed dismissal where Fla. Stat. 655.85 was preempted by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency's ("OCC") regulations promulgated pursuant to the NBA where Congress clearly intended that the OCC be empowered to regulate banking and banking-related services. The court also held that because plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim relied on identical facts as her claim under the state statute, it too was preempted.

Plaintiff and his wife brought a products liability action against defendant entities responsible for the manufacture, distribution, and package design of a product sold under the brand name Lewis Red Devil Lye ("RDL") where plaintiff was injured while using RDL to clear a clogged floor drain in the kitchen of the restaurant where he worked. At issue was whether summary judgment was properly granted in favor of defendant where plaintiff's handling of the product was not in accordance with the label's instructions and warnings. The court concluded that a defendant moving for summary judgment in a defective design case must do more than state, in categorical language in an attorney's affirmation, that its product was inherently dangerous and that its dangers were well known. Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment and held that defendant failed to demonstrate that its product was reasonably safe for its intended use; that is, the utility of the product outweighed the inherent danger.

Plaintiffs, manufactures of a bear-resistant container called the Ursack S29 model and three individual users of the Ursack, sued the Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group ("SIBBG"), as well as national and forest park services (collectively, "defendants"), where defendants withdrew conditional approval of the S29 model and refused to permit backpackers to use the S29 in the container-only areas of defendants' national parks and forests. At issue was whether SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was not arbitrary or capricious where the court could not conclude that the SIBBG, although it did not mention overflow food problems in the course of its debate, ignored this aspect of the problem; where the distinctions the SIBBG made between the BearVault and the Ursack were rational; and where SIBBG's tree-damage rationale, prohibiting users from tying the S29 model to trees, was not arbitrary or capricious.

Plaintiff sued defendants, manufacturers of the cigarettes that she smoked for 35 years, where plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in 1989, diagnosed with periodontal disease in 1990 or 1991, and did not sue defendants of the cigarettes that she had smoked until she was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2003. At issue was whether the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, which required that a suit be brought within a specified period of time after the cause of action accrued. The court held that when a later-discovered latent disease was separate and distinct from earlier-discovered disease, the earlier disease did not trigger the statute of limitations for a lawsuit based on the later disease.

Respondent, the rental property owner, filed a "Complaint for Repossession of Rented Property under Real Property section 8-401" against petitioner, the tenant, for failure to pay rent that was due. At issue was whether the owner of a multiple dwelling, who failed to obtain a license for the premises, as mandated by Section 11-10-102 of the Anne Arundel County Code, could nevertheless initiate summary ejectment proceedings for a tenant's failure to pay rent under Section 8-401 of the Real Property Article, Maryland Code. The court held that a rental property owner, such as the one here, who did not possess a current license to operate the premises was not entitled to utilize the summary ejectment procedures outlined in section 8-401 upon a tenant's failure to pay rent if the dwelling was located in a jurisdiction that required owners to obtain licenses. The court also held that the district court judge did not err in determining that petitioner did not demonstrate actual loss or injury due to respondent's failure to obtain a license for the premises and thus, was not entitled to damages.

Plaintiff, a former Nelnet, Inc. ("Nelnet") loan advisor, alleged that certain Nelnet marketing practices were continuing violations of the Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP") established under Part B of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1071, that rendered Nelnet liable under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). Plaintiff joined JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc. as defendants alleging they were knowing participants in a conspiracy to submit false claims. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's third amended complaint. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing plaintiff's claims where plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

Westwood Apex, a subsidiary entity of Westwood College, filed a breach of contract action against defendant to recover an unpaid student loan in San Bernardino County Superior Court. Defendant, a former Westwood College student, filed a class action counterclaim alleging that Westwood Apex and Westwood College committed fraud and engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices in connection with their operation of the college. Westwood College subsequently filed a notice of removal in the Central District of California. At issue was whether section 5 of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. 1453(b), allowed a party joined to an action as a defendant to a counterclaim, an additional counterclaim defendant, to remove the case to federal court. The court held that section 1453(b) did not permit additional counterclaim defendants to remove an action to federal court and therefore, affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state courts.

ConAgra Foods, Inc. ("ConAgra") sued Lexington Insurance, Co. ("Lexington") alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. ConAgra's claims arose from the alleged 2007 contamination of certain Peter Pan and Great Value peanut butter products that ConAgra manufactured. ConAgra subsequently sought coverage under its insurance policy with Lexington for personal injury claims arising from its contaminated products and Lexington denied coverage. At issue was whether the provision in the insurance policy provided coverage in light of the "lot or batch" provision in the policy. The court held that the "lot or batch" provision was ambiguous where, under one of the two reasonable interpretations, Lexington's duties to defend and indemnify were triggered. The court also held that, because the policy arguably provided coverage to ConAgra, Lexington's duty to defend was thereby triggered when ConAgra satisfied the applicable "retained limit" for a single "occurrence." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to ascertain the intent underlying the ambiguous policy language for purposes of determining whether there was ultimate policy coverage.