Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between Dr. Stan Schiff and Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies. Dr. Schiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated providers, claimed that Liberty Mutual's practice of reducing provider bills to an 80th percentile cap based on a computer-generated calculation violated Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Liberty Mutual argued that the statutory requirement to conduct a reasonable investigation into medical expenses is satisfied by determining the 80th percentile of charges for a treatment in the geographic area, and this practice is not an unfair practice under the CPA.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled that Liberty Mutual's practice of using the FAIR Health database to determine the 80th percentile of charges for a treatment in the geographic area is not unfair or unreasonable and does not violate the CPA or the personal injury protection (PIP) requirements to establish standards under which reasonable charges for medical procedures are determined. The court reasoned that comparing charges for the same treatment in the same geographic area is relevant to the determination of reasonableness. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court to enter a summary judgment order in favor of Liberty Mutual. View "Schiff v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In Virginia, Bryant McCants arranged for his 1970 Ford Mustang Mach 1 to be repaired at a shop operated by CD & PB Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Maaco Collision Repair & Auto Painting. The repair shop was managed by Hanson Butler, a part owner and employee of CD & PB Maaco. After the work was completed, McCants inspected the vehicle and was unsatisfied with the work, prompting Butler to agree to repaint it. However, due to various personal circumstances, McCants was unable to pick up the vehicle for several months. In the meantime, Butler initiated the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles' abandoned-vehicle process, which resulted in him acquiring title to the vehicle, which he later sold.McCants sued Butler for conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The jury found in favor of McCants on the conversion claim only and awarded him $78,500. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Butler had properly followed the abandoned-vehicle process and had obtained legal title to the vehicle.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that a rational jury could have found that Butler wrongfully used the DMV's abandoned-vehicle process as a pretext for severing McCants's ownership rights in the vehicle and thereafter claiming it for himself. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation order. View "McCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's order to compel arbitration and dismiss without prejudice a series of lawsuits against several sports goods e-commerce companies (the defendants). The lawsuits were brought by several plaintiffs, who were consumers that purchased goods online from the defendants and had their personal information stolen during a data breach on the defendants' websites. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in their terms of use. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the arbitration provision and that the arbitration clause was not invalid under California law, was not unconscionable, and did not prohibit public injunctive relief. Furthermore, the parties agreed to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator according to the commercial rules and procedures of JAMS, a private alternative dispute resolution provider. View "PATRICK V. RUNNING WAREHOUSE, LLC" on Justia Law

This case pertains to the enforcement of the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (the Act), a voter-enacted statute that expanded and amended the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. The California Privacy Protection Agency (the Agency) failed to adopt final regulations by the July 1, 2022 deadline set out in the Act. The California Chamber of Commerce sought a court order to delay enforcement of the Act until one year after the agency adopted all required regulations. The trial court granted the petition in part, ruling that the Agency could not enforce any regulation until one year after that regulation became final. The Agency appealed, arguing that the Act did not mandate a one-year delay between the approval of a final regulation and its enforcement. The appellate court agreed with the Agency, finding that the Act's language did not unambiguously require a one-year delay between approval and enforcement. The court ordered a new trial court order denying the Chamber's petition and allowing the trial court to consider any remaining issues regarding the prompt development of regulations. View "California Privacy Protection Agency v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A consumer, Reginald Kirtz, secured a loan from the Rural Housing Service, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Although Kirtz repaid his loan by mid-2018, the USDA continued to tell credit report company TransUnion that his account was past due, harming his credit score. The USDA failed to correct its records after being notified of the error, and Kirtz sued the agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.The USDA argued that the case should be dismissed based on sovereign immunity, since the Supreme Court has held that the federal government is immune from suits for damages unless Congress waives that immunity. The agency claimed that the FCRA does not make the federal government amenable to suit for a violation. The district court agreed, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the FCRA authorizes suits for damages against any person who violates the Act, and “person” is defined to include any government agency.The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit, finding that sovereign immunity did not bar Kirtz’s claim. The Court held that the federal government is susceptible to suit when it provides false information to credit reporting agencies. It noted that dismissing a suit like Kirtz’s case would effectively negate a claim that Congress has clearly authorized. The Court’s ruling resolved a circuit split between the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits, with which the Court agreed, and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, with which it disagreed. View "Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from a wrongful death action brought by Joni Babaletos, the personal representative of her late husband Thomas Babaletos, against Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., Philip Morris USA Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Babaletos claimed that the cigarettes produced and sold by the defendants caused her husband's death. She brought claims for breach of warranty in design, negligence in design and marketing, fraud, civil conspiracy, and unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 9. The jury found for the defendants on the four claims presented to them, and the trial judge subsequently found no liability with respect to the c. 93A claim.On appeal, Babaletos argued that the trial judge's imposition of time limits for the presentation of evidence forced her to omit essential evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Babaletos failed to demonstrate either an abuse of discretion by the trial judge or how she was prejudiced by the imposition of time limits. The court noted that the trial judge had repeatedly offered to extend scheduled half days to full days should the need arise during trial, but Babaletos made no such requests as the trial progressed. As such, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court also provided guidance for trial judges who believe that setting time limits for the presentation of evidence would be prudent in a particular case. View "Babaletos v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc." on Justia Law

In this Connecticut case, the plaintiff, Erin C. Hassett, purchased a used motor vehicle from the defendant, Secor’s Auto Center, Inc., and experienced mechanical problems shortly after the purchase. The plaintiff claimed the defendant breached its warranty by refusing to make necessary repairs and, as a result, she revoked her acceptance of the vehicle. The plaintiff brought legal action against the defendant, alleging breach of warranty and revocation of acceptance under statute § 42a-2608. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, including on her revocation of acceptance claim, awarding her $11,000 in damages.The plaintiff then moved for additur, requesting a refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle in addition to the $11,000 award. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, arguing that she was entitled to the $11,000 award plus a refund of the full purchase price because the jury found in her favor on her revocation of acceptance claim.The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for additur. The court found that the issue of revocation of acceptance damages had been submitted to the jury as a matter of disputed fact. The jury's award of $11,000 was determined to represent revocation of acceptance damages equivalent to its determination of "so much of the price as had been paid" in accordance with § 42a-2-711 (1). The plaintiff's argument that the court should have determined the proper measure of revocation of acceptance damages post-verdict was rejected. The court found that the plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the verdict did not constitute grounds to award her the full purchase price of the vehicle as a matter of law. View "Hassett v. Secor's Auto Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Nicholas Triantos, who sued various parties, including the law firm that represented Deutsche Bank in the foreclosure sale of his home, and the three partners of the firm. The district court dismissed his suit, and the law firm and its partners then moved for sanctions against Triantos under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court granted the motion and ordered Triantos to pay $10,000 in attorneys' fees and $32.00 in costs. Triantos appealed this order. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and vacated the order. The court found that the district court had imposed sanctions under Rule 11 without following the rule's procedural requirements. The court explained that the law firm served its motion on Triantos only after the district court had dismissed the case, and it did not meet its obligation under Rule 11's safe-harbor provisions to serve the motion on Triantos twenty-one days prior to filing it with the court. The district court also erred by imposing sanctions without describing in its order the sanctionable conduct or explaining the basis for its decision. View "Triantos v. Guaetta & Benson, LLC" on Justia Law

Charles Ramsey, a subscriber to Comcast Cable Communications, LLC’s Xfinity services, filed a lawsuit against Comcast for violations of California’s consumer protection statutes. He alleged that Comcast engaged in unfair, unlawful, and deceptive business practices under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and the unfair competition law (UCL). Ramsey’s complaint sought injunctive relief, not monetary damages. Comcast filed a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the parties’ subscriber agreement which required the parties to arbitrate all disputes and permitted the arbitrator to grant only individual relief. The trial court denied the petition based on the Supreme Court’s decision in McGill v. Citibank, which held that a predispute arbitration provision that waives a plaintiff’s right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum is unenforceable under California law. On appeal, Comcast argued that the trial court erred in concluding that Ramsey was seeking public injunctive relief. Comcast further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts McGill. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District held that Ramsey’s complaint seeks public injunctive relief, and that McGill is not preempted, thus affirming the trial court’s order. View "Ramsey v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of patients initiated a class action lawsuit against various hospitals and vendors who provide medical record production services to the hospitals. The plaintiffs alleged that the hospitals and vendors were involved in an illegal kickback scheme, where the vendors charged patients excessive prices for their medical records and used the profits to offer free and discounted pages to the hospitals for other types of medical records. The plaintiffs alleged violations of New York Public Health Law (PHL) § 18(2)(e) (which restricts the price that can be charged for medical records), New York General Business Law (GBL) § 349 (which prohibits deceptive business practices), and unjust enrichment. However, the New York Court of Appeals had previously ruled in Ortiz v. Ciox Health LLC that PHL § 18(2)(e) does not provide a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all the plaintiffs' claims. It found that the patients' GBL § 349 and unjust enrichment claims were essentially repackaging their PHL § 18(2)(e) claims, and therefore not cognizable as they attempted to circumvent the Ortiz ruling. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to allege any actionable wrongs independent of the requirements of PHL § 18(2)(e). The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim, and as such, the district court did not err in granting the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings, in denying the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment as moot, and in denying the plaintiffs' leave to file a second amended complaint. View "McCracken v. Verisma Systems, Inc." on Justia Law