Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

A home improvement and solar panel salesperson visited the home of senior citizens Harold and Lucy West, who lived with their adult daughter Deon. The salesperson, Ilai Mitmiger, discussed a solar installation and bathroom renovation, leading to a loan agreement package being completed electronically with Harold’s signature. Harold and Lucy, both in their 90s and suffering from dementia, did not use email, computers, or mobile phones. Deon believed the renovations would be paid for by a government program, as suggested by Mitmiger. The loan documents were sent to Deon’s email, opened on a mobile device, and signed electronically in Harold’s name within seconds.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Solar Mosaic LLC’s petition to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in the loan agreement. The court found that Mosaic had not proven the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, specifically that Harold was the person who completed the loan documents or that Deon had the authority to bind Harold to an arbitration agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the evidence strongly suggested Harold lacked the technical ability to execute the electronic signatures and demonstrated a factual dispute as to whether Harold actually signed the loan documents. The court also found that Mosaic had not proven Deon had the authority to bind Harold to the agreement or that Harold ratified the agreement through a recorded telephone call. The court concluded that the recorded call did not demonstrate Harold’s awareness or understanding of the loan agreement, and thus, there was no ratification. View "West v. Solar Mosaic, LLC" on Justia Law

In November 2014, Andre Pompey purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) from a dealership, with financing provided by the Bank of Stockton. Pompey later sued the dealership and the Bank, alleging that the retail installment sales contract did not include required disclosures under the Automobile Sales Finance Act (ASFA). Specifically, the contract failed to itemize the downpayment, showing $19,100 as a cash payment instead of $1,000 in cash and $18,100 in trade-in value. Pompey sought rescission of the contract and restitution of the amounts paid.The Superior Court of Fresno County ruled in favor of Pompey, concluding that the four-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied, rather than the one-year statute for statutory penalties. The court granted summary adjudication for Pompey against the dealership on the ASFA violation and, by stipulation, applied the judgment to the Bank under the Federal Trade Commission’s holder rule. The Bank appealed, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations for penalties should apply.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the rescission and restitution remedy under the ASFA is a penalty because it is imposed without regard to fault or actual damages and significantly limits the court's discretion. The court noted that the legislative history of the ASFA indicated it was intended to be a penalty. Consequently, the court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations for statutory penalties under Code of Civil Procedure section 340 applies. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Pompey v. Bank of Stockton" on Justia Law

The People of the State of California, represented by the San Diego City Attorney, filed a complaint against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. alleging violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) and false advertising law (FAL). The complaint claimed that Kaiser failed to maintain and update accurate health plan provider directories (PDs) as required by California Health and Safety Code section 1367.27, among other statutes. The inaccuracies in the PDs allegedly harmed consumers and competitors.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted Kaiser’s motion for summary judgment, exercising its discretion to abstain from adjudicating the action. The court concluded that the legislative framework did not impose an accuracy requirement on PDs and that adjudicating the case would require the court to assume the role of a regulator, which is better suited for the Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the doctrine of judicial abstention. The appellate court found that section 1367.27 does impose clear mandates for PD accuracy, which the trial court can enforce through its ordinary judicial functions. The appellate court also determined that the People’s enforcement of section 1367.27 through a UCL cause of action is complementary to the DMHC’s regulatory authority and does not interfere with it. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to vacate its order granting Kaiser’s motion for summary judgment and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "People ex rel. Elliott v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan" on Justia Law

Blake Wentworth, a former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California for various claims, including failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. Wentworth alleged that the Regents did not accommodate his bipolar II disorder and disclosed confidential information about him.The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on Wentworth's claims for failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. The court found that the Regents had engaged in the interactive process and offered reasonable accommodations, such as stopping Wentworth's tenure clock. The court also ruled that the invasion of privacy claim failed because Wentworth did not demonstrate that the Regents disclosed any confidential information.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on the interactive process and reasonable accommodations claims, finding that the Regents had acted appropriately. However, the appellate court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy claim, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents disclosed Wentworth's personal information in violation of the Information Practices Act (IPA).The appellate court also reversed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for attorney's fees and costs, remanding the case for further proceedings to determine whether Wentworth was entitled to fees under the catalyst theory or based on his success in obtaining his personnel file during the litigation. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for a retrial on the personnel file cause of action, finding that Wentworth had forfeited his challenge by failing to object to the verdict form before the jury was discharged. View "Wentworth v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed two class action complaints against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. in Orange County Superior Court, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). They claimed that Experian failed to include a required statement in the "Summary of Rights" portion of their consumer reports, which informs consumers of additional rights under state law. Plaintiffs sought actual, statutory, and punitive damages. Experian removed the cases to federal court, where Plaintiffs argued they lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because they did not suffer concrete harm. The federal court agreed and remanded the cases back to state court.In state court, Experian moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing under Wisconsin law and that their FCRA claim did not fall within the "zone of interests" the FCRA is designed to protect. Plaintiffs contended that California law should apply and that they had standing under California law. The trial court granted Experian's motion, relying on the precedent set by Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc., which held that a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury to have standing in California state courts. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court found Limon persuasive and concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete or particularized injury. The court held that an informational injury without adverse effects is insufficient to confer standing under California law. Therefore, the judgment in favor of Experian was affirmed. View "Muha v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

LVNV Funding, LLC (LVNV) filed a debt collection lawsuit against Yolanda Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Rodriguez cross-complained, alleging identity theft and violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act). Rodriguez discovered that LVNV had sued the wrong Yolanda Rodriguez, as the debt was incurred by someone with a different date of birth and Social Security number. LVNV dismissed its suit, but Rodriguez continued with her cross-claim, arguing that the FDCPA and Rosenthal Acts are strict liability statutes that penalize false or misleading debt collection actions unless a "bona fide error" defense applies.The Superior Court of Fresno County granted LVNV's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Rodriguez could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits because there was nothing false, deceptive, or misleading about the debt collection action. The court found that even the "least sophisticated debtor" would have recognized the address on the documentation was not hers, and there was "nothing inherently false" about the complaint being served on the wrong person.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the FDCPA creates a strict liability cause of action for attempts to collect a debt that misrepresent or falsely present the "character" or "amount" of a debt owed. The court noted that numerous federal courts have interpreted the FDCPA as allowing a cause of action for cases of mistaken identity. The court found that Rodriguez's claims had minimal merit and that the trial court erred in concluding she could not show a probability of succeeding on the merits. The order granting LVNV's anti-SLAPP motion was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "LVNV Funding v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney filed a complaint against Experian Data Corp. on March 6, 2018, alleging a violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) due to Experian's failure to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The complaint sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. Experian demurred, arguing the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the claim.The trial court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence of civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint. The parties then stipulated to dismiss the entire complaint, and the City Attorney appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The court also vacated the order denying the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "P. v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law

Donald Fleming filed a lawsuit against Caribou Creek Log Homes, Inc. and North Idaho Insulation, LLC, alleging that spray foam insulation installed by North Idaho Insulation caused significant structural damage to his residence in Montana. Fleming's claims included negligence, violations of residential construction defect statutes, the Montana Consumer Protection Act, and breach of warranties. North Idaho Insulation then filed a third-party complaint against Southwest Distributing Co. (Southwest), alleging that Southwest manufactured and sold the defective spray foam insulation and seeking indemnification and contribution.The Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court denied Southwest's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1). Southwest then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control, arguing that the District Court erred in its jurisdictional ruling.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the District Court erred in concluding it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest. The Supreme Court found that Southwest did not transact business in Montana related to the claims and that the claims did not arise from Southwest's activities in Montana. Additionally, the Court held that the stream-of-commerce theory did not apply, as Southwest did not purposefully direct its activities toward Montana. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of supervisory control, reversed the District Court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Southwest v. 19th Judicial Dist." on Justia Law

Campbell and Jennie Clegg purchased first-class round-trip tickets from American Airlines for themselves and three family members for travel between Albany, New York, and San Francisco, California, in May 2022. They agreed to American’s Conditions of Carriage, which required check-in at least 45 minutes before departure. The night before their flight, the Cleggs were unable to check in online and were instructed to check in at the airport. They arrived at the airport at 4:47 a.m. for their 6:04 a.m. flight but were unable to check in due to a computer system issue. Consequently, they missed their flight and later found that their return flight was canceled. They did not receive a refund for either flight.The Cleggs filed a complaint in the Cumberland County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and breach of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court granted American Airlines' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Cleggs’ claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. The Cleggs appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment in part. The court held that while the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state law claims related to airline services, the Cleggs could pursue a breach of contract claim based on the Conditions of Carriage. The court determined that the Cleggs might be entitled to a refund for their tickets and any extras, as specified in the Conditions of Carriage. However, the court affirmed that the Cleggs could not recover consequential or punitive damages, attorney fees, or costs, as these were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Clegg v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff leased a new 2021 Volkswagen Atlas from Galpin Volkswagen, LLC, and experienced several issues with the vehicle, including problems with the check engine and airbag lights, ignition, and door locks. After multiple repair attempts and delays due to a backordered part, the plaintiff requested Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (VWGA) to repurchase the vehicle. VWGA offered to repurchase the vehicle, including reimbursement for payments made and additional attorney fees, but included a financial confidentiality provision in the offer. Plaintiff did not accept the offer and continued to use the vehicle.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, VWGA and Galpin, on the plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims. The court found that VWGA’s offer to repurchase the vehicle was prompt and compliant with the Song-Beverly Act, including the calculation of the mileage offset and the inclusion of a financial confidentiality provision. The court concluded that the plaintiff could not prove damages for the breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, as VWGA’s offer exceeded the restitution amount required by the Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that VWGA’s offer was prompt and compliant with the Act, including the use of the vehicle’s agreed value for the mileage offset calculation. The court also determined that the financial confidentiality provision was permissible under the Act. As a result, the plaintiff could not prove the necessary elements for breach of express or implied warranty claims, and the summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Carver v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc." on Justia Law