Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff received two pre-recorded telemarketing calls from a vacation property company, which he alleged were made without his consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The company had used third-party vendors to conduct a large-scale telemarketing campaign, targeting individuals whose phone numbers had been obtained from opt-in websites. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a proposed class, filed suit against the company in April 2019, asserting that these calls violated federal law.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant engaged in extensive litigation over the course of four years. It filed answers with affirmative defenses, participated in class-related discovery, and litigated several motions, including opposing class certification and filing for summary judgment. Notably, the defendant did not assert arbitration as a defense until after the class was certified and significant litigation had occurred. When it finally raised arbitration—claiming that many class members had agreed to arbitrate through opt-in websites—the district court refused to allow the late amendment to add this defense, finding that it was too late and that the right to arbitrate had been waived. The district court later denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and the class, and ordered further settlement negotiations.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clarified the appropriate standard of review for orders denying motions to compel arbitration, holding that legal rulings with precedential effect are reviewed de novo, while the ultimate waiver determination is reviewed for clear error. The court further held that a defendant’s conduct prior to class certification is relevant in assessing waiver of the right to arbitrate. Finding no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that the defendant waived its arbitration rights by failing to timely assert them, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "Moore v Club Exploria, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves three individuals who were cast members on a reality television show. The plaintiff was engaged in a secret sexual affair with another cast member, who was the longtime boyfriend of the defendant. The defendant discovered the affair after finding sexually explicit videos of the plaintiff on her boyfriend’s cell phone, which had been recorded without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. The defendant then made recordings of these videos and sent them to the plaintiff, along with a confrontational text message. The situation became widely publicized, leading to significant media attention and public scrutiny of the plaintiff.The plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against both the boyfriend and the defendant, alleging claims for “revenge porn” under Civil Code section 1708.85, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that the defendant accessed the boyfriend’s phone without authorization, made copies of the explicit videos, and disseminated them to others, resulting in harm to the plaintiff. The defendant responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that her actions were protected as speech on a matter of public interest. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the claims arose from private conduct, not protected activity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the order denying the special motion to strike de novo. The court held that the defendant failed to meet her burden of showing that the plaintiff’s claims arose from constitutionally protected activity under section 425.16. Specifically, the court concluded that the alleged acquisition and dissemination of the private videos did not constitute conduct in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. The order denying the special motion to strike was affirmed. View "Leviss v. Madix" on Justia Law

Two consumers filed a lawsuit against a company that produces and sells eggs, challenging the company’s marketing claims that its hens are “free range” and “pasture raised on over 8 acres.” The plaintiffs alleged that these statements were deceptive because, in their view, the terms “pasture raised” and “free range” have objective meanings set by specific animal welfare certification organizations, and that consumers would expect the eggs to meet those standards. The plaintiffs sought to certify classes of California and New York consumers who purchased the eggs, arguing that the company’s advertising led consumers to pay a premium under false pretenses.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California considered the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. During this process, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion on the meaning of “pasture raised,” finding the expert’s methodology unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Without this expert opinion, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs could not show that deception was a common issue capable of classwide resolution, as required for predominance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Nonetheless, the court certified the classes, reasoning that common questions remained regarding the materiality of the statements and the calculation of damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting class certification. The Ninth Circuit held that, in the absence of admissible expert evidence regarding what consumers understand “pasture raised” to mean, the plaintiffs failed to show that common issues of deception predominated. The court further held that common questions of materiality and damages could not, by themselves, justify class certification when the element of deception was not established on a classwide basis. View "RUSOFF V. THE HAPPY GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

A fatal car accident involving an eighteen-year-old driving a 2013 Toyota Scion led to a lawsuit by the driver’s estate against Toyota and Subaru, who had jointly developed the vehicle. The plaintiff alleged negligence, product liability, and violations of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, claiming that design defects caused the occupant compartment to collapse and a fire to spread, ultimately resulting in the driver’s death. During discovery, the plaintiff requested extensive documents and depositions, including English translations of Japanese-language materials. Toyota and Subaru objected to several document requests and deposition topics, and disputes arose regarding the timing and sufficiency of their responses.The Superior Court of Robeson County granted the plaintiff’s motions to compel, ordered the production of additional documents (including English translations), and mandated that Toyota and Subaru’s corporate representatives testify to all noticed deposition topics without further objection. When the defendants failed to comply as ordered, the trial court imposed sanctions, deeming certain facts established against them—including elements of duty and breach in the plaintiff’s product liability claim—and struck their regulatory compliance defense. Toyota and Subaru appealed, challenging the discovery and sanctions orders.The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the sanctions order and reversed the requirement to translate documents but otherwise affirmed the discovery order, holding that most of the trial court’s actions were not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed only the remaining issues in the discovery order. It held that the trial court erred by enforcing a fourteen-day deadline for objections to document requests in deposition notices (rather than the seven days required by the rules), and by waiving defendants’ objections to deposition topics for not seeking a protective order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision, instructed it to vacate the discovery order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc" on Justia Law

A married couple enrolled their children at a private school that, until the 2020–2021 academic year, offered a traditional curriculum. Following the events of summer 2020, the school shifted its curriculum to emphasize issues of race and gender identity. The parents became concerned after learning their sixth-grade child was exposed to controversial teachings and age-inappropriate materials. They joined a group of parents to express their concerns to the school’s leadership. After the parents met with school officials, the school abruptly expelled their children and accused the parents of making racist remarks, which the parents deny.The parents filed suit in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging breach of contract, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, defamation, and other claims. The trial court, Judge Lisa C. Bell presiding, dismissed all claims except for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The parents voluntarily dismissed that remaining claim to appeal. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of all other claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine whether the parents’ complaint satisfied the state’s “notice pleading” standard for surviving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the parents adequately alleged claims for breach of contract, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices based on their fraud allegations, and defamation. The court found that their breach of contract claim was viable because they alleged the school expelled their children under a false pretext, in violation of the contract. The fraud and defamation claims also survived due to sufficient factual allegations. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings on these claims, but affirmed or declined to review the dismissal of other claims. View "Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including a data privacy company serving public officials and several individually named police and correctional officers, alleged that a broad range of defendants, such as data brokers and marketing companies, continued to disclose the home addresses and phone numbers of individuals protected under Daniel’s Law after receiving formal requests to cease disclosure. The data privacy company, acting as an assignee for thousands of covered persons, facilitated these take-down requests. Plaintiffs claimed that, despite notice, defendants failed to comply within the statutory period, exposing individuals to risks such as stalking and threats.After the plaintiffs filed numerous civil actions in New Jersey state court, defendants removed the cases to federal court, where the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, with a judge from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania presiding, consolidated and considered the cases. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing Daniel’s Law was facially unconstitutional, particularly objecting to the apparent lack of a mental state requirement for liability. The district court denied the motions, reasoning that the statute could be interpreted to require at least negligence, not strict liability, for actual damages, to avoid constitutional concerns.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of New Jersey the question of whether Daniel’s Law requires a mental state for liability. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that Daniel’s Law, as currently written, does not require any mental state—such as negligence, knowledge, or recklessness—to impose liability for actual damages under its civil cause of action. The Court based its decision on the statute’s text, legislative history, and the legislature’s omission of a mental state requirement where such language was used elsewhere in the statute. View "Atlas Data Privacy Corp. v. We Inform, LLC" on Justia Law

A software company operated an online payment portal used by residents, including the plaintiff, to pay rent for Maryland apartments. Each time the plaintiff paid rent through the portal, she was charged a convenience fee. To complete a transaction, users were required to check a box agreeing to the portal’s hyperlinked terms and conditions, which included an arbitration provision, a clause allowing unilateral changes to the agreement, and a notice provision stating that notices would be posted on the portal. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, filed a class action, alleging that the company unlawfully acted as an unlicensed collection agency by collecting these fees.After the action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the company moved to compel arbitration based on the terms and conditions. The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under Maryland law because the company’s ability to unilaterally change the terms without advance notice rendered its promise to arbitrate illusory. The district court agreed, finding that the contract was a browsewrap agreement and that the modification and notice clauses allowed the company to change terms at will without meaningful notice or an opportunity for users to opt out before changes became binding.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under Maryland law, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration because the company’s promise to arbitrate was illusory. The court reasoned that the change-in-terms clause gave the company unfettered discretion to modify the agreement at any time, without advance notice, thus failing to bind the company meaningfully. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Trimble v. Entrata, Inc." on Justia Law

Several individuals who purchased and used Samsung smartphones and tablets alleged that the preinstalled Samsung Gallery app created and stored face templates by scanning photographs for facial geometry, thereby capturing biometric data. They claimed that Samsung’s proprietary algorithm measured unique facial features, and the resulting face templates were stored locally on their devices. Plaintiffs argued that Samsung controlled the biometric data, since users had no way to disable the facial recognition features, and Samsung’s privacy policy indicated it “may collect” such information. They further contended that Samsung lacked a written policy for retention and destruction of biometric data and failed to provide required disclosures or obtain releases, in violation of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Information Act (“BIPA”).The plaintiffs initially filed their suit in Illinois state court, seeking class certification for all Illinois residents whose biometric data was collected or stored by Samsung. Samsung removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Class Action Fairness Act. After several amended complaints and motions to dismiss, the district court ultimately granted Samsung’s third motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Samsung possessed or exerted control over the biometric data stored on users’ devices.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that under both Illinois law and BIPA, “possession,” “collection,” and “capture” require a degree of control by the company over the biometric data. Because the plaintiffs’ allegations did not plausibly show that Samsung itself controlled the facial geometry data generated by the app, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. View "G.T. v Samsung Electronics America, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff leased a new vehicle from the defendant, but soon experienced persistent defects that could not be repaired despite multiple attempts. After the defendant failed to promptly replace the vehicle or provide restitution under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff filed suit for breach of warranty, seeking damages and attorney fees. During litigation, the defendant made a statutory settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, presenting two alternative sets of terms: a lump-sum payment or a reimbursement option requiring proof of damages, both accompanied by provisions for attorney fees and costs.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages totaling $76,155.27, less than the lump-sum alternative in the defendant’s 998 offer. The trial court found the offer valid, imposed section 998’s cost-shifting penalty, limited plaintiff’s postoffer costs and attorney fees, and awarded defendant its postoffer costs. The plaintiff appealed, contesting the validity of the alternative-choice offer. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s awards, finding the lump-sum alternative sufficiently certain but deemed alternative-choice offers categorically invalid for cost-shifting purposes.The Supreme Court of California reviewed whether an offer under section 998 that presents two independent, alternative sets of terms for acceptance is categorically invalid due to uncertainty. The Court held that such an alternative-choice offer can be valid if it clearly presents the alternatives and at least one alternative is sufficiently certain to permit accurate valuation at the time the offer is made. If the judgment or award does not exceed the highest valued, valid alternative, cost-shifting under section 998 is permitted. The Court affirmed the trial court’s award, but rejected the Court of Appeal’s categorical prohibition of alternative-choice offers under section 998. View "Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Three individuals, all cast members of a reality television show, became embroiled in a public scandal when one, Rachel Leviss, had a secret sexual affair with another cast member, Tom Sandoval, who was in a relationship with fellow cast member Ariana Madix. The affair came to light when Sandoval’s phone fell into Madix’s possession during a public event. Upon accessing his phone—using a passcode known to her from their longstanding relationship—Madix discovered and recorded sexually explicit videos of Leviss that Sandoval had secretly made. Madix then sent these videos to Leviss and informed the show’s production team, after which the affair became widely publicized.Leviss filed a civil suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against Sandoval and Madix, asserting causes of action for violation of privacy and “revenge porn,” among others. She alleged that Madix had obtained and disseminated the explicit videos without consent, causing Leviss emotional and reputational harm. Madix responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16), arguing that her conduct was protected as activity in connection with a public issue involving public figures. The Superior Court denied Madix’s motion, finding that the conduct did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, and that the gravamen of Leviss’s claims was private conduct, not public commentary.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling, holding that Madix failed to meet her burden to show that Leviss’s claims arose from constitutionally protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court determined that the unauthorized acquisition and dissemination of private sexual videos did not qualify as conduct in connection with a public issue or a matter of public interest as required by the statute. View "Leviss v. Madix" on Justia Law