Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Taylor L. Wood, her husband, and her son received medical care from physicians employed by Intermountain Emergency Physicians, PLLC (IEP). The resulting medical debt was assigned to Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS) for collection. After Wood’s attorneys alleged violations of state law, the Woods and IEP entered into a settlement that discharged the debt and provided payment to the Woods. Nevertheless, MRS later sued Wood to collect the same debt. Wood responded by counterclaiming and bringing IEP into the case as a third-party defendant, relying on the settlement agreement. MRS dismissed its complaint upon learning of the prior settlement, and all claims were eventually dismissed by the court.After judgment was entered, both sides sought a determination of the prevailing party and an award of attorney fees. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County, found that Wood was the prevailing party over MRS and ordered MRS to pay Wood’s costs and attorney fees, concluding that MRS’s complaint was frivolous due to lack of proper investigation and communication regarding the settlement. MRS and IEP filed a first motion for reconsideration of the fees order, which was denied. They then filed a second motion for reconsideration, also denied, and subsequently appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order awarding costs and attorney fees to Wood because MRS and IEP’s notice of appeal from that order was untimely under Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a). The court did have jurisdiction to review the denial of the second motion for reconsideration, but because MRS and IEP failed to provide argument or authority on that issue, they waived it. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the second motion for reconsideration. View "Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Wood" on Justia Law

More than one hundred individuals who became tenants at three apartment complexes in Los Angeles applied to rent from the property owners by filling out standard applications and paying $41.50 screening fees. The landlords used these fees to obtain credit and background reports. The plaintiffs alleged that the landlords violated California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) by failing to disclose the scope of the investigations, the identity of the reporting agencies, the right to inspect information, and by not providing copies of the consumer reports. Three plaintiffs also asserted a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on the same alleged violations.After consolidating the cases, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that none of the plaintiffs had shown actual damages or concrete injury resulting from the alleged ICRAA violations, and thus lacked standing. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ UCL claims failed for similar reasons, as they did not lose money or property due to the alleged conduct.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, held that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their ICRAA claims because the statute provides a $10,000 minimum recovery for violations without requiring proof of actual damages or concrete injury. The court found that the statutory remedy is punitive and serves to deter violations, granting standing based on the violation itself. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the UCL claims, concluding that plaintiffs did not suffer an “injury in fact” or lose money or property as required for UCL standing. The judgment was therefore reversed as to the ICRAA claims, affirmed as to the UCL claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yeh v. Barrington Pacific" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff purchased a new Hyundai vehicle that experienced repeated mechanical issues, leading to seven repair attempts over 19 months. After the buyer or his wife requested Hyundai repurchase the vehicle, it was involved in a collision and declared a total loss. The wife’s insurer paid her for the vehicle’s loss. The plaintiffs—comprised of the buyer and his wife—then sued Hyundai under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging breach of express warranty, among other claims. After some claims were dismissed, only the express warranty claim proceeded to trial.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed the wife to join as a plaintiff, even after finding she was not the buyer, based on the belief that prior precedent allowed her to proceed. The jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs, awarding damages and prejudgment interest, but the court reduced the damages by the amount of the insurance payment and adjusted the interest calculation. Both sides filed post-trial motions regarding prejudgment interest and costs, and both appealed aspects of the judgment and cost rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that only a “buyer” as defined by the Act has standing to pursue claims under it; since the wife was not a buyer, she lacked standing and should not have been a party. The court also ruled that insurance payouts received after a vehicle is totaled cannot reduce the statutory restitution owed by the manufacturer under the Act. Additionally, the court found that prejudgment interest is available under Civil Code section 3288. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest and reconsideration of costs. View "Towns v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

Daevieon Towns purchased a new Hyundai Elantra in 2016, and over the next 19 months, the car required multiple repairs for alleged electrical and engine defects. In March 2018, either Towns or his wife, Lashona Johnson, requested that Hyundai buy back the defective vehicle. Before Hyundai acted, the car was involved in a collision, declared a total loss, and Johnson’s insurance paid her $14,710.91.Towns initially sued Hyundai Motor America in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. As trial approached, Towns amended his complaint to add Johnson as a plaintiff, arguing she was the primary driver and responsible for the vehicle. The trial court allowed the amendment, finding Johnson was not a buyer but permitted her to proceed based on its interpretation of Patel v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. At trial, the jury found for Towns and Johnson, awarding damages and civil penalties. However, the court reduced the damages by the insurance payout and adjusted the prejudgment interest accordingly. Both parties challenged the judgment and costs in post-trial motions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that only a buyer has standing under the Act, so Johnson could not be a plaintiff. The court also held that third-party insurance payments do not reduce statutory damages under the Act, following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC. Furthermore, prejudgment interest is available under Civil Code section 3288 because Hyundai’s statutory obligations do not arise from contract. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to enter a modified judgment and reconsider costs. View "Towns v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

The case involves an Arizona resident who received an unsolicited text message on his cell phone during the 2020 presidential election campaign. The message, sent by the Republican National Committee, included written text and an automatically downloaded video file featuring a still image of Ivanka Trump with a play button overlay. The plaintiff alleged the video contained an artificial or prerecorded voice and stated he never gave prior express consent to receive such messages. He claimed the message was part of a broader campaign targeting Arizona residents.In the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, the plaintiff filed a putative class action, alleging violations of two provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA): 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 227(b)(1)(B), both prohibiting calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice without prior consent. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the statute did not apply because the recipient had to actively press play to hear the video’s audio, and, for the § 227(b)(1)(B) claim, because the message was exempted under FCC regulations for certain nonprofit organizations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA’s prohibitions apply only to the use of artificial or prerecorded voices in the manner in which a call is begun. Because the text message was made and initiated without the automatic playing of a prerecorded voice—the recipient had to affirmatively choose to play the video—the conduct did not violate the statutory provisions. The court concluded that sending a text message containing a video file that requires recipient interaction to play does not constitute “making” or “initiating” a call “using” a prerecorded voice under the TCPA. View "HOWARD V. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE" on Justia Law

Ridgeline Medical, LLC provided medical services to David Lyon and sought to recover $777 in unpaid charges. Ridgeline sent a final billing statement to Lyon at his provided address, but Lyon did not receive it and did not pay. Ridgeline retained a law firm to collect the debt, which sent demand letters to the same address, also not received by Lyon. Subsequently, Ridgeline initiated a lawsuit for breach of an implied-in-fact contract and reported Lyon’s debt to a consumer reporting agency. Lyon responded by alleging Ridgeline’s actions violated the Idaho Patient Act (IPA) and counterclaimed for statutory penalties under the Act, asserting noncompliance with its procedural requirements.The Magistrate Court for Bonneville County initially found some IPA provisions unconstitutional, severed them, and dismissed Ridgeline’s complaint for noncompliance with the remaining requirements. It denied Lyon’s claim for statutory penalties, finding that provision violated the Eighth Amendment as applied. The Idaho Attorney General intervened to defend the Act’s constitutionality. After further briefing and argument, the magistrate court vacated its prior decision, held the IPA constitutional in full, dismissed Ridgeline’s complaint again, and awarded statutory penalties to Lyon. On intermediate appeal, the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District affirmed the magistrate court’s amended decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the magistrate court’s decision independently, with due regard for the district court’s ruling. The Supreme Court held that the challenged IPA provisions regulate commercial speech and are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which they satisfy. The court found no violation of the First Amendment (speech or petition), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection or due process), or Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the IPA against Ridgeline’s constitutional challenges. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Ridgeline Medical, LLC v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Milliman, Inc. operates a service that compiles consumer medical and prescription reports, which are then sold to insurers for underwriting decisions. The named plaintiff, James Healy, applied for life insurance, but Milliman provided a report to the insurer containing another person's medical records and social security number. This erroneous report flagged Healy as high risk for several serious medical conditions he did not actually have, resulting in the denial of his insurance application. Healy attempted to correct the report, but Milliman did not timely investigate or remedy the errors.Healy filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging that Milliman’s procedures violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to ensure maximum possible accuracy. The district court certified an “inaccuracy class” for those whose reports included mismatched social security numbers and risk flags. Milliman moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Healy needed to show class-wide standing at this stage. The district court agreed, finding under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), that Healy had failed to present direct evidence of concrete injury on a class-wide basis, and dismissed the inaccuracy class.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, following class certification in damages actions, both named and unnamed class members must present evidence of standing at summary judgment. However, the court clarified that plaintiffs may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence, and need only show that a rational trier of fact could infer standing, not that standing is conclusively established. The panel reversed the district court’s partial summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the correct summary judgment standard. View "HEALY V. MILLIMAN, INC." on Justia Law

Corpay, Inc., a publicly traded company based in Atlanta, Georgia, markets fuel credit cards to businesses, primarily small and medium-sized enterprises. The cards were advertised to offer per-gallon fuel savings, “fuel only” purchase restrictions, and no transaction fees. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought suit alleging that Corpay’s advertisements were misleading and its billing practices unfair. The FTC presented evidence that customers received significantly lower discounts than advertised, that “fuel only” cards were frequently used for non-fuel purchases, and that transaction fees were charged despite claims to the contrary. Additionally, Corpay was found to have automatically enrolled customers in various add-on programs and fees, often without clear disclosure or express consent, and assessed late fees even when customers paid on time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed these claims. It granted summary judgment for the FTC on all five counts, holding that Corpay’s advertisements and fee practices were deceptive and unfair under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The court also found Corpay’s CEO, Ronald Clarke, personally liable due to his authority and knowledge of the company’s practices. To address ongoing and potential future violations, the district court issued a permanent injunction, requiring clear and unavoidable fee disclosures and separate customer assent for each fee charged.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment and permanent injunction against Corpay on all counts. It also affirmed summary judgment against Clarke on four counts but vacated the judgment on the “fuel only” advertising count, remanding for further proceedings on that issue. The appellate court held that the injunction’s requirements for express informed consent and prominent disclosure were within the district court’s equitable authority. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Federal Trade Commission v. FleetCor Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Blue Beach Bungalows DE, LLC sought to purchase Pine Haven, a manufactured home and RV community in Delaware, from its longtime owner. After entering a purchase agreement in March 2022, Blue Beach sent numerous letters to residents, informing them of changing tenancy statuses, threatening eviction, police action, and property destruction, and imposing shifting deadlines to vacate. These aggressive tactics prompted complaints to the Delaware Department of Justice (DOJ), which initiated an administrative enforcement action against Blue Beach for violations including the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), alleging false or misleading statements regarding the nature of residents’ living arrangements and improper rent solicitations.After a four-day hearing, the administrative Hearing Officer largely ruled in favor of the DOJ, penalizing Blue Beach over $700,000 for statutory violations. Blue Beach appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, which affirmed some violations and vacated others. The Superior Court held the CFA applied to communications made after the underlying transaction and found the CFA constitutional, rejecting Blue Beach’s arguments about the right to a jury trial. The DOJ cross-appealed the vacation of certain penalties.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case. It held that the plain language of the CFA does not apply to post-transaction communications, reversing the Superior Court on that issue. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s finding that the CFA is constitutional and does not violate Delaware’s jury trial right, because the statutory cause of action is not sufficiently analogous to common law fraud. The Court declined to address the DOJ’s cross-appeal, finding those issues moot in light of its holding on the CFA’s scope. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Blue Beach Bungalows DE, LLC v. Department of Justice Consumer Protection Unit" on Justia Law

Joneca Company, LLC, and InSinkErator, LLC, are direct competitors in the garbage disposal market. InSinkErator alleged that Joneca marketed its disposals using horsepower designations that misrepresented the actual output power of the motors, thereby misleading consumers. InSinkErator claimed that industry and consumer standards understood horsepower to refer to the motor’s mechanical output, not merely the electrical input, and that Joneca’s advertising was causing it to lose sales and goodwill. InSinkErator tested Joneca’s products and found the output horsepower to be substantially less than advertised, prompting it to seek injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed these allegations in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction. After considering expert declarations and industry standards, the district court found that Joneca’s horsepower claims were literally false by necessary implication, as consumers would interpret horsepower designations as referring to output. The court also found that these claims were material to consumer purchasing decisions and that InSinkErator was likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. As a result, the court ordered Joneca to place disclaimers on its packaging and sales materials and required InSinkErator to post a $500,000 bond. Joneca appealed, challenging the district court’s findings on falsity, materiality, irreparable harm, balancing of hardships, and public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that InSinkErator was likely to succeed on the merits of its Lanham Act false advertising claim, that Joneca’s horsepower claims were materially misleading, and that InSinkErator faced irreparable harm. The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s balancing of equities, bond requirement, or determination that the injunction served the public interest. View "INSINKERATOR, LLC V. JONECA COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law