Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated.In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties.The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Chesapeake Exploration, LLC (Chesapeake) and Morton Production Company, LLC (Morton) entered into a joint operating agreement for oil and gas development in Converse County, Wyoming. Morton sued Chesapeake for breach of contract, violation of the Wyoming Royalty Payment Act (WRPA), and conversion after Chesapeake adjusted Morton’s ownership interest and withheld production proceeds. Chesapeake counterclaimed for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Morton.Chesapeake appealed, challenging the district court’s summary judgment on Morton’s breach of contract claim, the supplemental decision on Chesapeake’s counterclaims and affirmative defenses, and the determination that Chesapeake violated the WRPA. The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that Chesapeake breached the contract by adjusting Morton’s ownership interest and billing for costs beyond the twenty-four-month limitation period specified in the 1985 COPAS Form, which was incorporated into the joint operating agreement. The court found the language in the COPAS Form unambiguous and declined to consider extrinsic evidence. The court also upheld the district court’s use of Rule 60(a) to correct a clerical error in its original order and found that Chesapeake’s counterclaims were properly dismissed as they were rendered moot by the summary judgment on Morton’s claims. Additionally, the court ruled that Chesapeake violated the WRPA by withholding production proceeds without placing the disputed funds in escrow, as required by the statute. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, v. Morton Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Former Spokane police officer Jeffery Thurman was the subject of a June 13, 2019 article in the Spokesman-Review, owned by Cowles Co., which alleged he was fired for racial slurs, sexual harassment, and talk of killing black people. On June 14, 2021, Thurman filed a defamation lawsuit against Cowles Co. Shortly after, on July 25, 2021, the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) took effect. Thurman amended his complaint on December 3, 2021, adding new factual allegations and a claim under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).The trial court partially granted Cowles' special motion for expedited relief under the UPEPA, dismissing Thurman’s CPA claim but denying the motion to dismiss the defamation claim, reasoning that the defamation claim was part of the original complaint. Cowles appealed the denial of expedited relief for the defamation claim, and Thurman cross-appealed the dismissal of his CPA claim.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the UPEPA applied to both Thurman’s defamation and CPA claims. The majority reasoned that the defamation claim was "asserted" on a continuing basis on the UPEPA’s effective date. The dissent argued that the defamation claim was not "asserted" on or after July 25, 2021, and thus the UPEPA did not apply.The Washington Supreme Court held that Thurman’s amended defamation claim relates back to the original complaint filed on June 14, 2021, and is not subject to the UPEPA. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, deciding the case on statutory grounds and declining to address the constitutional arguments. View "Thurman v. Cowles Co." on Justia Law

Michael Wood incurred credit card debt with Pentagon Federal Credit Union (PenFed) and defaulted. PenFed reported the debt to credit reporting agencies, but Wood disputed the debt in writing. PenFed investigated and concluded the debt was valid. Later, Security Credit Services, LLC (SCS) purchased Wood's debt from PenFed and reported it as delinquent to a credit reporting agency without noting Wood's dispute. Wood alleged that SCS violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by failing to communicate that he disputed the debt.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of SCS. The court found that Wood had standing to sue but concluded that PenFed reasonably interpreted Wood's lack of response to its letter as an indication that he no longer disputed the debt. Therefore, the court determined that SCS did not know and should not have known that Wood still disputed the debt.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Wood had standing because the harm he alleged was analogous to defamation, a recognized common law injury. The court also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether SCS should have known about Wood's dispute. Specifically, the court noted conflicting evidence about SCS's understanding of what constitutes a disputed account and whether SCS shared PenFed's interpretation that Wood's silence meant he no longer disputed the debt. The court concluded that SCS's failure to communicate Wood's dispute could be considered negligent under the FDCPA. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wood v. Security Credit Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The National Automobile Dealers Association and the Texas Automobile Dealers Association challenged the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Combating Auto Retail Scams Trade Regulation Rule (CARS Rule). They argued that the FTC violated its own regulations by not issuing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), failed to provide a reasoned basis for the rule, and conducted an arbitrary and capricious cost-benefit analysis. Alternatively, they requested a remand for additional evidence consideration.The FTC published the CARS Rule without an ANPRM, which led to the petitioners seeking judicial review. The rule aimed to address deceptive practices in the auto sales industry, including misrepresentations, mandatory disclosures, prohibitions on valueless add-ons, and requirements for consumer consent. The FTC received over 27,000 comments during the rulemaking process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FTC violated its own regulations by not issuing an ANPRM, which is required under subpart B procedures for rules promulgated under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the FTC Act. The court determined that the Dodd-Frank Act did not grant the FTC independent substantive authority to bypass the ANPRM requirement. The court also rejected the FTC's argument for deference under Auer v. Robbins and Kisor v. Wilkie, finding no relevant ambiguity in the regulations.The court concluded that the FTC's failure to issue an ANPRM was not harmless error, as it deprived the petitioners of a procedural benefit that could have influenced the final rule. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the CARS Rule, without addressing the petitioners' remaining substantive challenges. View "National Automobile Assoc v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

John Doe filed a putative class action against SSM Health Care Corporation in Missouri state court, alleging that SSM shared private health information with third-party marketing services without authorization, violating Missouri law. Doe claimed that SSM's MyChart patient portal transmitted personal health data to third-party websites like Facebook. The lawsuit included nine state law claims, such as violations of the Missouri Wiretap Statute and the Computer Tampering Act.SSM removed the case to federal court, citing the federal officer removal statute and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Doe moved to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected SSM's arguments, ruling that SSM was not "acting under" a federal officer and that Doe's proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, thus lacking the minimal diversity required under CAFA. The district court remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SSM did not meet the criteria for federal officer removal because it was not acting under the direction of a federal officer. The court also held that the proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, which destroyed the minimal diversity necessary for CAFA jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's remand order. View "Doe v. SSM Health Care Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the Cigar Association of America and other plaintiffs challenging a regulation by the FDA that applied to premium cigars. The FDA had issued a rule under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which brought all tobacco products, including premium cigars, under its regulatory authority. The plaintiffs argued that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious as applied to premium cigars, citing studies that suggested premium cigars posed fewer health risks due to less frequent use.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, presided over by Judge Mehta, found in favor of the plaintiffs. The court determined that the FDA had failed to consider relevant evidence, specifically the Corey study and Monograph No. 9, which indicated that premium cigars were used less frequently and posed fewer health risks. The district court vacated the FDA's rule as it applied to premium cigars, finding the agency's action arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the FDA's rule was arbitrary and capricious because the agency ignored relevant data and falsely claimed that no such evidence existed. The appellate court upheld the vacatur of the rule as applied to premium cigars but remanded the case to the district court to invite further briefing on the appropriate definition of "premium cigars." The court emphasized that the vacatur should not allow for revisiting past user fee payments. The decision affirmed the district court's ruling in full, except for the need to refine the definition of premium cigars. View "Cigar Association of America v. FDA" on Justia Law

Rebecca Petta filed a class-action complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County against Christie Business Holdings Company, P.C., doing business as Christie Clinic. Petta alleged that Christie negligently failed to prevent unauthorized access to its business email account, which potentially exposed patients' private personal data, including Social Security numbers and health insurance information. Christie moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court granted the motion.The trial court found that Petta had standing due to an inference of injury from unauthorized use of her phone number and city in a loan application. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a valid claim under existing law and due to the economic loss doctrine. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal but on the grounds that Petta lacked standing, as the alleged increased risk of identity theft was too speculative and the unauthorized loan application did not involve her private personal data.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court. The court held that Petta's allegations of increased risk of harm were insufficient to confer standing in a complaint seeking monetary damages. The court also found that the unauthorized loan application, which used only Petta's publicly available phone number and city, was not fairly traceable to Christie's alleged misconduct. Consequently, the court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, concluding that Petta lacked standing to bring her claims. View "Petta v. Christie Business Holding Co., P.C." on Justia Law

Lance and Tracy Degeneffe entered into a roofing contract with Home Pride Contractors, Inc. to repair their roof, gutters, and siding after wind and hail damage. Home Pride completed the repairs and billed the Degeneffes, who refused to pay, leading Home Pride to hire an attorney to collect the debt. The Degeneffes sued Home Pride, alleging that its prior counsel engaged in harassing and abusive collection efforts in violation of the Iowa Consumer Credit Code (ICCC).The Iowa District Court for Boone County reviewed cross motions for summary judgment. Home Pride argued it was not subject to the ICCC as it did not extend credit or lend money to its customers. The Degeneffes argued that the roofing contract was a consumer credit sale subject to the ICCC and that Home Pride’s conduct was harassing and abusive under the ICCC. The district court denied Home Pride’s motion and granted the Degeneffes’ motion in part, establishing that the roofing contract constituted a consumer credit sale subject to the ICCC, but left the question of whether Home Pride’s conduct was harassing and abusive for trial.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the roofing contract was a consumer credit sale subject to the ICCC. The court concluded that Home Pride did not grant credit to the Degeneffes, as the contract required full payment upon completion of the work, and the 1.5% monthly interest charge for late payment did not constitute an extension of credit. The court reversed the district court’s entry of partial summary judgment in favor of the Degeneffes and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Home Pride. View "Degeneffe, v. Home Pride Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Carmen Mercado and Jorge Lopez, filed a class action complaint against their former employer, S&C Electric Company, in the circuit court of Cook County. They alleged that S&C underpaid their overtime wages by excluding certain performance bonuses from the "regular rate" of pay used to calculate overtime. S&C argued that the bonuses were statutorily excluded from the regular rate of pay and that they had made adjusted payments to cover any alleged unpaid wages.The circuit court granted S&C's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding that the adjusted payments satisfied the alleged underpayment. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing that the bonuses were properly excluded from the regular rate of pay and that the adjusted payments fully compensated the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' judgments. The court held that the performance bonuses should have been included in the regular rate of pay for calculating overtime wages. The court found that the bonuses were not gifts but compensation for services performed, and thus did not fall under the exclusion in section 210.410(a) of the regulations. Additionally, the court held that the adjusted payments did not fully compensate the plaintiffs for their statutory damages, including treble damages, monthly interest, and attorney fees, as required by section 12(a) of the Minimum Wage Law.The Supreme Court of Illinois remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mercado v. S&C Electric Co." on Justia Law