Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Green Development, LLC (Green Development) sought interconnection with the distribution system of Narragansett Electric Company (Narragansett), a public utility. Accommodation of the increased flows of electricity required certain upgrades to the transmission system owned by Respondent-Intervenor New England Power Company d/b/a National Grid (NE Power). NE Power assigned the costs of the transmission system upgrades directly to Narragansett. The newly assigned costs were reflected in a revised transmission service agreement (TSA) that NE Power and Narragansett filed for approval by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission or FERC). Green Development protested the revised TSA. The Commission denied Green Development’s protest.  Green Development petitions for review contending that the Commission (1) erroneously concluded that Green Development’s arguments in the underlying section 205 proceeding operated as a “collateral attack” on the Complaint Order; (2) improperly applied the governing seven-factor test; (3) misinterpreted the Tariff’s definition of “direct assignment facilities”; and (4) erroneously failed to apply the filing procedures of Schedule 21-Local Service of the Tariff.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions. First, the court held that Commission has cured any purportedly erroneous ruling that Green Development’s section 205 protest constituted a collateral attack on the Complaint Order. The court rejected Green Development’s fourth claim. The court wrote that the issue with Green Development’s contention is that it presumes that the procedures in Schedule 21-Local Service are “mandatory processes” that applied to the filing of the TSA. But, the SIS and associated technical arrangements “pertain to initiating transmission service” and “do not demonstrate that Narragansett as an existing transmission customer was required to request new transmission service” under the Tariff. View "Green Development, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Defendants' motion to preclude the opinions and testimony of Dr. Steven Elliot Caplan, Plaintiff's designated expert in the area of pediatric medicine.Plaintiff alleged that Defendants, who owned and managed property in which Plaintiff lived as a child, were liable for injuries she sustained as a result of exposure to lead-based paint at the property. After Plaintiff designated Dr. Caplan as her expert Defendants moved to preclude his opinions and testimony. The circuit court granted the motion and then entered summary judgment for Defendants, finding that Dr. Caplan lacked a sufficient factual basis for his opinions and that, without his testimony as to causation, Plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in ruling on the motion to preclude, the circuit court erroneously resolved genuine disputes of material fact; (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment; and (3) Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence. View "Oglesby v. Baltimore School Associates" on Justia Law

Petitioners Rick Hendrick Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram (Rick Hendrick Dodge) and Isiah White argued an arbitrator had to decide whether they could enforce an arbitration provision in a contract even after that contract had been assigned to a third party. The court of appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the circuit court's determinations that: (1) the circuit court was the proper forum for deciding the gateway question of whether the dispute is arbitrable; and (2) Petitioners could not compel arbitration because Rick Hendrick Dodge assigned the contract to a third party. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the doctrine announced in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) required the arbitrator to decide whether the assignment extinguished Petitioners' right to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and vacated the circuit court's discovery order. View "Sanders v. Savannah Highway Automotive Company" on Justia Law

In August 2019, Plaintiff filed a class action against GoDaddy. The putative class alleged that the web-hosting company embarked on an unlawful telemarketing campaign. Objector-Appellant then filed an objection and moved to reconsider the fee award. He made two arguments. First, he objected that the district court awarded fees to class counsel twenty days before the court’s purported objection deadline. Second, he claimed that the parties’ settlement was a “coupon settlement” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1712(e) of the Class Action Fairness Act because GoDaddy class members could select GoDaddy vouchers as their recompense. The question at the core of this appeal is whether the plaintiffs who received a single unwanted, illegal telemarketing text message suffered a concrete injury.   The Eleventh Circuit remanded this appeal to the panel to consider the CAFA issues raised in Appellant’s appeal. The court held that the receipt of an unwanted text message causes a concrete injury. The court explained that while an unwanted text message is insufficiently offensive to satisfy the common law’s elements, Congress has used its lawmaking powers to recognize a lower quantum of injury necessary to bring a claim under the TCPA. As a result, the plaintiffs’ harm “is smaller in degree rather than entirely absent.” View "Susan Drazen, et al v. Mr. Juan Pinto" on Justia Law

The PredictIt Market is an online marketplace that lets people trade on the predicted outcomes of political events. Essentially, it is a futures market for politics. In 2014, a division within the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issued PredictIt a “no-action letter,” effectively allowing it to operate without registering under federal law. But, in 2022, the division rescinded the no-action letter, accusing PredictIt of violating the letter’s terms but without explaining how. It also ordered all outstanding PredictIt contracts to be closed in fewer than six months. Various parties who participate in PredictIt (collectively, “Appellants”) challenged the no-action letter’s rescission in federal district court and moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court has not ruled on that motion, though, despite PredictIt’s looming shutdown. Appellants sought review, treating the district court’s inaction as effectively denying a preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that a preliminary injunction was warranted because the CFTC’s rescission of the no-action letter was likely arbitrary and capricious. So, the court remanded for the district court to enter a preliminary injunction while it considers Appellants’ challenge to the CFTC’s actions. The court explained that the DMO’s withdrawal of no-action relief constitutes final agency action. Further, the decision to rescind a no-action letter is not “committed to agency discretion by law.” The court concluded that the revocation of the no-action letter was likely arbitrary and capricious because the agency gave no reasons for it. And the agency’s attempts to retroactively justify the revocation after oral argument—and in the face of our injunction—only underscore why Appellants are likely to prevail. View "Clarke v. CFTR" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute about CoolSculpting, a medical device intended to minimize the appearance of fat. When Plaintiff tried CoolSculpting, he developed a rare condition called Paradoxical Adipose Hyperplasia (“PAH”), which enlarges the targeted fat tissue. Needless to say, Plaintiff was unhappy that CoolSculpting maximized the fat he wanted to minimize. So Plaintiff sued Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc., the manufacturer of the CoolSculpting system, for failure to warn and design defects under Florida law. The district court granted Zeltiq summary judgment. On failure to warn, the district court concluded that Zeltiq’s warnings about PAH were adequate as a matter of law. On design defect, the court determined that Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that the risk of CoolSculpting outweighed its utility. Plaintiff challenged both of the district court’s rulings on appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Zeltiq warned medical providers in its user manual and training sessions about the exact condition Plaintiff experienced: PAH is an increase of adipose tissue in the treatment area that may require surgery to correct. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded Zeltiq’s warnings were adequate as a matter of law. Further, the court held that it is convinced that Plaintiff’s defect claim fails under either test. View "Terrance Nelson Cates v. Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court denying Hoosier Contractors, LLC's motion for summary judgment, denying Sean Gardner's motion for partial summary judgment, and denying Hoosier's motion to decertify a class of Hoosier's similarly situated customers, holding that Gardner, on behalf of himself and as class representative, lacked standing to bring his counterclaim against Hoosier.When Gardner asked Hoosier to inspect the roof of his home Hoosier made Gardner sign a contract for Hoosier to perform any needed work. When Gardner refused to let Hoosier repair his roof Hoosier brought this action for breach of contract. Gardner filed a counterclaim, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated customers, alleging that the contract violated the Indiana Home Improvement Contractors Act and that the violations were deceptive acts under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. The Supreme Court held (1) Gardner lacked standing to bring his counterclaim against Hoosier, and this disposition mooted the class-action issues; and (2) the court of appeals properly affirmed the denial of Gardner's motion for partial summary judgment as to Hoosier's breach of contract claim. View "Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner" on Justia Law

An employee alleged that her employer, White Castle, introduced a system that required its employees to scan their fingerprints to access their pay stubs and computers. A third-party vendor then verified each scan and authorized the employee’s access. In a suit under the Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d), White Castle argued that the action was untimely because her claim accrued in 2008 when White Castle first obtained her biometric data after the Act’s effective date.The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that section 15(b) and 15(d) claims accrue each time a private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, rather than only upon the first scan and first transmission. The court “respectfully suggested” that the legislature address the policy concerns inherent in the possibility of awards of substantial damages. View "Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff leased a Subaru Forester in November 2018. Defendant Trans Union, LLC received certain information about the lease and reported that information on Sessa’s credit report. In particular, Trans Union reported that Plaintiff owed a “balloon payment” at the end of the lease term -- a payment that the terms of the lease did not, in fact, require. Plaintiff sued Trans Union under section 1681e(b) of the FCRA, which requires credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”), like Trans Union, to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” in a consumer’s credit report. 15 U.S.C. Section 681e(b). The district court granted Trans Union summary judgment, reasoning that Plaintiff's credit report could not be considered “inaccurate” under section 1681e(b) because the question of whether Plaintiff owed a balloon payment amounted to a legal, rather than factual, dispute.The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court concluded that section 1681e(b) does not incorporate a threshold inquiry as to whether an alleged inaccuracy is “legal” or “factual” in nature. The court, therefore, determined that the district court erred by ending its analysis after it found that the accuracy of the reported balloon payment amounted to a legal dispute and was, therefore, not actionable under section 1681e(b). View "Sessa v. Trans Union, LLC" on Justia Law

Camarena defaulted on a debt, then married Ross. Ross and Camarena share a phone plan. FAMS, a debt collector, mailed Camarena a letter. Camarena never followed the letter’s instructions but learned FAMS’s employee email address format and sent emails disputing his debt to FAMS’s CEO and Vice President. The CEO had no recollection of seeing Camarena’s email and could not locate it, while the VP found it in his deleted folder but could not recall ever seeing it. Had Camarena properly submitted his dispute, FAMS could have followed its policy of stopping collection activity until the account was validated. FAMS called Ross concerning Camarena’s debt. Ross initially informed FAMS that it had called her personal cell phone, not an appropriate number for Camarena. The FAMS collector failed to follow procedures to prevent her from receiving future calls, despite his training. FAMS continued to call Ross.Ross sued FAMS, alleging that the calls violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 by continuing debt collection activities after Camarena disputed the debt without first providing verification of the debt; calling Ross after Camarena disputed the debt; calling Ross after she notified FAMS that Camarena does not use her phone; and disconnecting calls with Ross. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of FAMS based on the “bona fide error” defense. FAMS had policies and procedures that should have prevented the calls from going out to Ross. View "Ross v. Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc." on Justia Law