Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Rosenberg-Wohl had a State Farm homeowners insurance policy, covering her San Francisco home. The policy required lawsuits to be “started within one year after the date of loss or damage.” In late 2018 or early 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl noticed that an elderly neighbor twice stumbled on Rosenberg-Wohl’s outside staircase and learned that the pitch of the stairs had changed. The staircase needed to be replaced. In April 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl authorized the work and contacted State Farm. On August 9, she submitted a claim for the money she had spent. On August 26, State Farm denied the claim. Rosenberg-Wohl’s husband, an attorney, later contacted State Farm “to see if anything could be done.” In August 2020 a State Farm adjuster said it had reopened the claim. Days later, it was denied.In October 2020, Rosenberg-Wohl filed suit, alleging breach of the policy and bad faith. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and was dismissed based on the one-year limitation provision. It is currently on appeal. Another action alleges a violation of California’s unfair competition law. The California court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of that suit, rejecting arguments that the one-year limitation provision does not apply to the unfair competition claim, and that State Farm waived the limitation provision. View "Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Brinker International, Inc. (“Brinker”), the owner of Chili’s restaurants, faced a cyber-attack in which customers’ credit and debit cards were compromised. Chili’s customers have brought a class action because their information was accessed (and in some cases used) and disseminated by cyber criminals. The district court certified the class, and Brinker appealed that decision. On appeal, Brinker mounted three arguments: 1) the District Court’s class certification order violates our precedent on Article III standing for class actions; 2) the district court improvidently granted certification because the class will eventually require individualized mini-trials on class members’ injuries; and 3) the district court erred by finding that a common damages methodology existed for the class.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated in part and remanded. The court explained that although all three plaintiffs adequately allege a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing, two of the plaintiffs' allegations face a fatal causation issue. The court explained that while the district court’s interpretation of the class definitions surely meets the standing analysis, the court has outlined for one of the named plaintiffs, the court noted that the phrase in the class definitions “accessed by cybercriminals” is broader than the two delineated categories the district court gave, which were limited to cases of fraudulent charges or posting of credit card information on the dark web. Therefore, the court remanded this case to give the district court the opportunity to clarify its predominance finding. View "Eric Steinmetz, et al v. Brinker International, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff used Roundup on his lawn for thirty years until 2016, when he was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma, a form of cancer. He sued Monsanto, Roundup’s manufacturer, in the district court. He alleged that Monsanto knew or should have known that Roundup was carcinogenic but did not warn users of that danger. The question on appeal is whether, under an express preemption provision, a federal agency action that otherwise lacks the force of law preempts the requirements of state law. The district court ruled that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. Section 136v(b), expressly preempts some of Plaintiff’s claims under Georgia law because the Environmental Protection Agency had approved a label for Roundup that lacked a cancer warning and the Agency classifies Roundup’s main ingredient—glyphosate—as “not likely to be carcinogenic.” Plaintiff argued that his suit is not preempted.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the question at issue must be answered by recourse to ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, and the court remanded this appeal to the panel to decide whether Plaintiff’s suit is preempted. The court explained that a conflict between a state-law rule that has the force of law and a federal agency rule that does not have the force of law is not the type of conflict between state and federal legal obligations that the Supremacy Clause addresses. But this reasoning does not extend to express-preemption cases the meaning of the express-preemption provision—not conflicting federal and state legal obligations—triggers preemption. View "John D. Carson v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. Defendants Eddie Bauer LLC and Eddie Bauer Parent, LLC, operate the Eddie Bauer Outlet chain of stores, where they sell branded clothing. More than 90 percent of the products offered at the outlet stores are manufactured solely for sale at the outlet stores and were not sold elsewhere. Defendants advertised clothing at the Eddie Bauer Outlet stores as being sold at a substantial discount; with limited exceptions, the clothing was never sold at the “list” price. In 2017, plaintiff Susan Clark purchased two articles of clothing from one of defendants’ outlet stores in Oregon. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging that defendants had violated multiple provisions of the UTPA, including, among others, ORS 646.608(1)(j) (making false or misleading representations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions), and ORS 646.608(1)(ee) (advertising price comparisons without conspicuously identifying the origin of the price the seller is comparing to the current price). Plaintiff alleged she had been fraudulently induced to buy those garments by defendants’ false representation that she was buying them at a bargain price. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that it failed to allege an “ascertainable loss of money or property,” as required of a complainant pursuing a private right of action under the UTPA. The federal appellate court asked the Supreme Court whether a consumer suffered an "ascertainable loss" when the consumer purchased a product that the consumer would not have purchased at the price that the consumer paid but for a violation of [ORS] 646.608(1)(e), (i), (j), (ee), or (u), if the violation arose from a representation about the product’s price, comparative price, or price history, but not about the character or quality of the product itself. The Oregon Court answered the Ninth Circuit's question in the affirmative. View "Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC" on Justia Law

Ford Motor Company advertised its Shelby GT350 Mustang as “track ready.” But some Shelby models weren’t equipped for long track runs, and when the cars overheated, they would rapidly decelerate. A group of Shelby owners sued Ford on various state-law fraud theories and sought class certification, which the district court granted in substantial part. Ford challenged class certification on the ground that proving each plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged misinformation requires individualized proof and, therefore, that common questions don’t “predominate” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the statutory classes in Florida, New York, Missouri, and Washington. The court reversed the certification of the Texas statutory consumer-fraud claim and the Tennessee, New York, and Washington common-law fraud claims. And the court remanded for the district court to consider whether the facts, in this case, support a presumption of reliance for the California statutory and common-law fraud claims and whether California- and Texas-based breach-of-implied-warranty claims satisfy state-law requirements. Finally, the court instructed the district court on remand to reconsider the manageability issue. View "George Tershakovec, et al v. Ford Motor Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provides subsidies to encourage telecommunication companies to expand high-speed broadband internet services in rural areas where customer revenues would otherwise be insufficient to justify the cost of doing business. Venture Communications Cooperative (“Venture”) provides broadband services to rural South Dakota customers. James Valley Cooperative Telephone Company and its wholly owned subsidiary, Northern Valley Communications (collectively, “Northern Valley”), is a competing provider. Venture filed this lawsuit against Northern Valley. The primary claim is that Northern Valley violated 47 U.S.C. Section 220(e) by filing a Form 477 that “intentionally, deliberately, fraudulently, and maliciously misrepresented” information “for the sole unlawful purpose of harming [Venture]” by depriving Venture of FCC subsidies in census blocks where Northern Valley was deemed to be an unsubsidized competitor. The district court granted Northern Valley summary judgment, concluding “there is no evidence that Northern Valley willfully overreported its broadband capabilities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Venture’s claim of intent to injure is belied by Northern Valley helping Venture by filing a letter with the FCC clarifying that Northern Valley did not offer voice service in the Overlap Area. The court likewise affirmed the dismissal of Venture’s tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims under South Dakota law. The court agreed with the district court that Venture proffered no evidence of an “intentional and unjustified act of interference” because Northern Valley complied with all FCC reporting requirements. As Northern Valley complied with the Telecommunications Act in filing Form 477 at issue, there is no plausible underlying tort alleged. Summary judgment is warranted on this claim. View "Venture Comm. Co-Op, Inc. v. James Valley Co-Op Telephone Co." on Justia Law

Frazier obtained a home mortgage loan for which Dovenmuehle served as sub-servicer. Beginning in October 2015, Frazier failed to make her monthly payments. Frazier successfully negotiated and settled her debt through a short sale of her home, which closed in January 2016. Frazier was later denied a new mortgage loan because her Equifax credit report reflected late payments on her previous mortgage in months following the short sale. She disputed the information to several credit reporting agencies. To confirm the accuracy of its records, Equifax sent Dovenmuehle four Automated Consumer Dispute Verification forms in 2019-2020. Frazier contends the amended codes Dovenmuehle gave Equifax for Pay Rate and Account History were inaccurate, pointing to how Equifax interpreted and reported the amended data in her credit reports.Frazier sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, claiming that Dovenmuehle failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of disputed data and provided false and misleading information to credit reporting agencies. She relied on evidence about persisting inaccuracies in Equifax’s credit reports produced using the amended data. The district court granted Dovenmuehle summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the full record, no reasonable jury could find that Dovenmuehle provided patently incorrect or materially misleading information. View "Frazier v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Herbal Brands, Inc., which has its principal place of business in Arizona, brought suit in Arizona against New York residents that sell products via Amazon storefronts. Herbal Brands alleged that Defendants’ unauthorized sale of Herbal Brands products on Amazon to Arizona residents and others violated the Lanham Act and state law. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that if a defendant, in its regular course of business, sells a physical product via an interactive website and causes that product to be delivered to the forum, then the defendant has purposefully directed its conduct at the forum such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction may be appropriate. The panel applied the Arizona long-arm statute, which provides for personal jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of federal due process. Due process requires that a nonresident defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.   The panel held that Herbal Brands met its initial burden of showing that Defendants purposefully directed their activities at the forum because, under the Calder effects test, Defendants’ sale of products to Arizona residents was an intentional act, and Herbal Brands’ cease-and-desist letters informed defendants that their actions were causing harm in Arizona. The court held that Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona, Herbal Brands’ harm arose out of those contacts, and the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable in the circumstances. View "HERBAL BRANDS, INC. V. PHOTOPLAZA, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. Under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), a person who suffers an “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of another person’s violation of the UTPA may maintain a private action against that person. The Ninth Circuit's question required a determination of whether a consumer could suffer an “ascertainable loss” under the UTPA based on a retailer’s misrepresentation about price history or comparative prices. More specifically, the Oregon Court had to consider whether a consumer suffered a cognizable “ascertainable loss” under ORS 646.638(1) when she buys items at an outlet store that have been advertised as being sold at a substantial discount but that have never been sold at that or any other location at the “list,” or non-sale price. To this, the Oregon Court responded in the affirmative. View "Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the circumstances of the underlying case, the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. 30106, protected an automobile dealership from being held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the driver of its courtesy vehicle.An automobile dealership based in New Jersey provided a courtesy vehicle to a customer while it serviced the customer's vehicle in its automobile service center. Contrary to the terms of the courtesy vehicle agreements, the customer drove the vehicle beyond the permitted radius of travel and into the Commonwealth, where the vehicle struck one of the plaintiffs, causing serious injuries. Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the dealership and the customer. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the dealership, as the owner of the courtesy vehicle, was presumptively vicariously liable for the injuries caused by the customer's wife. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment for the dealership and vacated the judgment for the customer, holding (1) the Graves Amendment protected the dealership from liability in this case; and (2) there was a dispute of material fact as to the negligent entrustment claim against the customer. View "Garcia v. Steele" on Justia Law