Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Vicki Hebert filed a putative class action against Barnes & Noble, Inc. (Barnes & Noble), alleging it willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). According to Hebert, Barnes & Noble willfully violated the FCRA by providing job applicants with a disclosure that included extraneous language unrelated to the topic of consumer reports. The Act required employers like Barnes & Noble provide a job applicant like Herbert a standalone disclosure stating that the employer may obtain the applicant’s consumer report when making a hiring decision. Barnes & Noble moved for summary judgment, arguing that no reasonable jury could find its alleged FCRA violation was willful. The company asserted it included the extraneous information in its disclosure due to an inadvertent drafting error. The trial court agreed with Barnes & Noble, granted the company’s motion, and entered judgment in the company’s favor. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court, determining a reasonable jury could have found that Barnes & Noble acted willfully because it violated an unambiguous provision of the FCRA, at least one of the company’s employees was aware of the extraneous information in the disclosure before the disclosure was displayed to job applicants, the company may not have adequately trained its employees on FCRA compliance, and/or the company may not have had a monitoring system in place to ensure its disclosure complied with the FCRA. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hebert v. Barnes & Noble, Inc." on Justia Law

Ralph and Heidi Bowser bought a 2006 Ford F-250 Super Duty truck, with a 6.0-liter diesel engine (6.0L engine). They had owned a 2004 model of the same truck; that turned out to be a lemon. The dealership, however, assured them that Ford had “fixed” the problems. After the purchase, the truck required repair after repair. After the truck had about 100,000 miles on it, the Bowsers largely stopped driving it; it mostly sat in their driveway. The Bowsers’ expert testified that, in his opinion, the 6.0L engine had defective fuel delivery and air management systems. Over Ford’s objections, the Bowsers introduced a number of internal Ford emails and presentations showing that Ford was aware that certain parts of the 6.0L engine, including fuel injectors, turbochargers, and EGR valves, were failing at excessive rates, and that Ford was struggling to find the root cause of some of these failures. Ford conceded liability under the Song-Beverly Act. A jury found for the Bowsers on all causes of action, and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Ford appealed, raising a number of alleged evidentiary errors at trial, and challenged the jury’s award of damages. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Bowser v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor seeking to seize funds in bank accounts held by the judgment debtor’s spouse served a notice of levy on the bank’s agent for service of process. The agent misread the form and rejected it. The agent informed the bank of its mistake and the bank then froze the funds, however, the spouse had all but drained the accounts. Plaintiff filed a motion for a court order imposing third-party liability on Defendant for its noncompliance with the notice of levy, which the trial court denied.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s ruling in the bank’s favor and held that the bank is liable for its agent’s negligence in misreading the service of process form. The court further held that the bank is liable for some of the funds withdrawn. The court reasoned that a third person’s “fail[ure] or refus[al]” to deliver property subject to a levy “without good cause” renders the third person “liable to the judgment creditor” for the amounts withdrawn and covered by the levy. Further, the principal’s failure to deliver property subject to a levy is excused when an agent’s mistake constitutes “good cause.” Here, because the agent, in this case, was negligent in misreading the standardized form it was served with, the agent for service of process—and hence its principal, the bank—had reason to know of the levy, such that the bank is liable to the judgment creditor for some of the withdrawn funds. View "Bergstrom v. Zions Bancorporation" on Justia Law

In 2008, Morris defaulted on her home mortgage. After negotiating a loan modification, she again defaulted in 2009. Morris and her husband, Mazhari, then filed two bankruptcy proceedings. Mazhari died while the second bankruptcy was pending. Morris unsuccessfully tried to obtain another loan modification. Following the 2016 lifting of the automatic stay in her third bankruptcy, Morris’s home was sold at public auction to Chase, the deed of trust beneficiary and successor to the original lender. Morris claims that the trustee’s sale occurred without notice to her because Chase and then Rushmore, the loan servicer, pursued foreclosure secretly while giving her false assurances that loan modification terms were forthcoming and shuttling her between uninformed representatives who gave her inconsistent information about her modification request.Morris sought post-foreclosure relief, including damages, an order setting aside the trustee’s sale, and a declaration quieting title under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR) (Civ. Code 2923.6, 2923.7) and other theories. In 2018, the trial court dismissed all claims. After another delay occasioned by another bankruptcy, Morris appealed. The court of appeal reversed in part, with respect to claims alleging failure to appoint a single point of contact (HBOR 2923.7), dual tracking (2923.6), and failure to mail upon request a notice of default and notice of trustee’s sale 2924b). The court otherwise affirmed. View "Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a class action, alleging SC Data Center, Inc. (“SC Data”) committed three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. Sections 1681-1681x. In May 2016, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement. Four days later, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), which led SC Data to move to dismiss this action for lack of standing. On remand, the district court determined that Plaintiff had standing as to all three claims.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders and held that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing and remanded the matter to the district court with directions to remand the case to state court. The court held that the text of the FCRA nor the legislative history provide support for Plaintiff’s claim that she has a right under the FCRA to not only receive a copy of her consumer report but also discuss directly with the employer accurate but negative information within the report prior to the employer taking adverse action. Further, the court concluded that Plaintiff has not established that she suffered a concrete injury due to the improper disclosure, thus she lacks standing to pursue her improper disclosure or failure to authorize claims. View "Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc." on Justia Law

On the panel's initial hearing of the case, Judge Higginson concluded that the restrictions on the President's removal authority under the Consumer Financial Protection Act are valid and constitutional. Judge Higginson found that neither the text of the United States Constitution nor the Supreme Court's previous decisions support appellants' arguments that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is unconstitutionally structured, and thus he affirmed the district court's judgment.More than two years later, and after conducting a vote among the circuit judges, the Fifth Circuit vacated its previous opinion and elected to hear the case en banc. View "CFPB v. All American Check Cashing, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court confirming an arbitration award in favor of Car Credit, Inc., holding that the arbitration agreement was valid and that the circuit court did not err.Cathy Pitts entered into a retail installment contract and security agreement with Car Credit to purchase and finance a vehicle. The parties also entered into a written arbitration agreement. After Car Credit repossessed the vehicle and sued Pitts for the remaining deficiency balance Pitts filed a counterclaim alleging an unlawful and deceptive pattern of wrongdoing followed by Car Credit. The circuit court sustained Car Credit's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator entered an award on the merits' of Pitts' claim in favor of Car Credit. The circuit court entered judgment for Car Credit on all causes of action in accordance with the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. View "Car Credit, Inc. v. Pitts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prohibit certification of a class of individuals who received documents from Petitioner containing language that purportedly violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (WVCCPA), W. Va. Code 46A-2-127(g), holding that the circuit court's order did not sufficiency analyze the predominance and superiority factors of W. Va. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).Respondents, like the class they proposed to represent, purchased a dissatisfactory HVAC unit from Petitioner. Respondents filed a putative class action alleging that the documents used by Petitioner violated the WVCCPA. The circuit court eventually certified a class action. Petitioner then sought a writ of prohibition challenging the class certification on two grounds. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition as to the first ground but granted it as to the second, holding that the circuit court's order was conclusory as to its analysis of the predominance and superiority factors. View "State ex rel., Dodrill Heating & Cooling, LLC v. Honorable Maryclaire Akers" on Justia Law

Following a data breach targeting servers owned by Defendant, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant violated federal securities laws by omitting material information about data vulnerabilities in their public statements.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, finding that the investors did not adequately allege that any of Defendant’s statements were false or misleading when made.The court explained that to state a claim under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must first allege a “material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant.” However, not all material omissions give rise to a cause of action. Here, Plaintiffs focus on statements about the importance of protecting customer data; privacy statements on Defendant's website; and cybersecurity-related risk disclosures. The court found that Plaintiffs failed to allege that any of the challenged statements were false or rendered Defendant's public statement misleading. Although Defendant could have disseminated more information to the public about its vulnerability to cyberattacks, federal securities law does not require it to do so. View "Construction Laborers Pension Trust Southern CA v. Marriott International, Inc." on Justia Law

Outstanding debt for Chicago traffic tickets surpassed $1.8 billion last year. Under a 2016 Chicago ordinance, when a driver incurs the needed number of outstanding tickets and final liability determinations, Chicago is authorized to impound her vehicle and to attach a possessory lien. Many drivers cannot afford to pay their outstanding tickets and fees, let alone the liens imposed on their cars through this process. Mance incurred several unpaid parking tickets; her car was impounded and subject to a possessory lien of $12,245, more than four times her car’s value. With a monthly income of $197 in food stamps, Mance filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and sought to avoid the lien under 11 U.S.C 522(f). When a vehicle owner files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, she can avoid a lien under 522(f) if the lien qualifies as judicial and its value exceeds the value of her exempt property (the car). If the lien is statutory, it is not avoidable under the same provision.The bankruptcy and district courts and the Seventh Circuit concluded that the lien was judicial and avoidable. The lien was tied inextricably to the prior adjudications of Mance’s parking and other infractions, so it did not arise solely by statute, as the Bankruptcy Code requires for a statutory lien. View "City of Chicago v. Mance" on Justia Law