Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated cases, the plaintiffs owe consumer debts they claim are not owned by the creditors listed on their credit reports. They approached the consumer reporting agencies and requested an investigation of their claims. The consumer reporting agencies contacted the purported creditors for verification that they owned the debts, which the creditors confirmed. Although informed of these confirmations, the plaintiffs did not believe that the consumer reporting agencies investigated the claims as thoroughly as 15 U.S.C. 1681i of the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires, so they sued.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the claims. The plaintiffs’ allegations that the creditors did not own their debts are not factual inaccuracies that the consumer reporting agencies are statutorily required to guard against and reinvestigate, but primarily legal issues outside their competency. The plaintiffs are not without recourse. They could confront the creditors who are in the best position to respond to assertions that they do not own the plaintiffs’ debts or, under 15 U.S.C. 1681i(c), make notations of their disputes on their credit reports. The burden to determine whether their debts were validly assigned is not on the consumer reporting agencies. View "Cowans v. Equifax Information Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of a putative consumer class action alleging that Trader Joe's misleadingly labeled its store brand honey as "100% New Zealand Manuka Honey." The district court agreed with Trader Joe's that its product is 100% honey whose chief floral source is Manuka, and that no reasonable consumer would believe that it was marketing a product that is impossible to create.The panel concluded that the district court did not err in determining that Trader Joe's Manuka Honey labeling would not mislead a reasonable consumer as a matter of law. In this case, the district court based much of its decision on the FDA's Honey Guidelines, which set the standards for the proper labeling of honey and honey products. The panel stated that Trader Joe's meets this standard. The panel also concluded that the district court properly held that Trader Joe's representation of "Manuka Honey" as the sole ingredient on its ingredient statement was not misleading as a matter of law. Therefore, plaintiffs have not alleged, and cannot allege, facts to state a plausible claim that Trader Joe's Manuka Honey is false, deceptive, or misleading. View "Moore v. Trader Joe's Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Linda and Dwayne Struiksma lost title to their home in a foreclosure sale. The purchaser at the sale then brought an unlawful detainer action against them under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a(b)(3). A default judgment was issued, and plaintiffs were evicted from their property. Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendants HSBC Bank USA, N.A. and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (collectively, defendants), their lender and loan servicer, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer action. Generally, they alleged defendants carelessly failed to credit several payments to their loan balance. Thus, plaintiffs contended they were never in default and defendants wrongfully foreclosed on the property. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the complaint, finding all of plaintiffs’ claims were precluded by the unlawful detainer judgment except for a claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), which was defective for other reasons. Plaintiffs were denied leave to amend on all claims and appealed the resulting judgment. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in ruling plaintiffs’ claims were precluded, and published this case to clarify the preclusive effect of an unlawful detainer action under section 1161a. Defendants also argued certain claims the trial court found precluded failed for reasons other than preclusion. Given its ruling, the court had no opportunity to consider these arguments. So, this case was remanded for the trial court to consider them in the first instance. As to the TILA claim, the Court held it suffered from several defects, and the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to this claim without leave to amend. View "Struiksma v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Carrington on plaintiff's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim. The court agreed with the district court that Carrington's alleged misrepresentations and unfair conduct were not made or carried out in connection with an attempt to collect a debt, and thus plaintiff failed to allege a claim under the Act.In this case, the communications at issue were not made in connection with an attempt to collect on the underlying mortgage debt. Although the boilerplate disclosures section of each letter stated "for the purpose of collecting a debt," these types of boilerplate mini-Miranda disclosures do not automatically trigger the protections of the Act. Rather, the court looked to the substance of the letter, which did not try to induce plaintiff to pay his outstanding debt. View "Heinz v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Consumer Product Safety Commission revised its safety standard for infant bath seats, stating: “Each infant bath seat shall comply with all applicable provisions of ASTM F1967–19, Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Infant Bath Seats.” When Milice, a then-expectant mother, contacted Commission staff about inspecting the ASTM standard, they were told they would have to purchase the standard from its developer. Milice challenged the 2019 Rule on the grounds that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the First and Fifth Amendments because its content is not freely available to the public. The D.C. Circuit declined to address Milice’s arguments, finding her petition for review was untimely, having been filed more than 60 days after the 2019 Rule was published in the Federal Register, 15 U.S.C. 2060(g)(2). A revised voluntary safety standard issued by an outside organization that serves as the basis of a Commission standard “shall be considered to be a consumer product safety standard issued by the Commission” effective 180 days after the Commission is notified, “unless . . . the Commission notifies the organization that it has determined that the proposed revision does not improve the safety of the consumer product covered by the standard,” 15 U.S.C. 2056a(b)(4)(B). View "Milice v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

Weaver purchased Champion dog food. Champion’s packaging describes the food as biologically appropriate, made with fresh regional ingredients, and never outsourced. Weaver alleged that: Champion’s food is not made solely from fresh ingredients but contains ingredients that were previously frozen; Champion uses previously manufactured food that failed to conform to specifications, as dry filler; Champion uses ingredients that are past the manufacturer’s freshness window; Champion does not source all its ingredients from areas close to its plants and sources some ingredients internationally; and there is a risk that its food contains BPA and pentobarbital.Weaver filed a purported class action, alleging violations of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act, fraud by omission, and negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his suit on summary judgment. Weaver had failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine that any of the representations were false or misleading. Weaver only offered his own testimony to prove how a reasonable consumer would interpret “biologically appropriate” and offered no evidence that he purchased dog food containing pentobarbital. He failed to show that Champion had a duty to disclose the risk that its food may contain BPA or pentobarbital. Humans and animals are commonly exposed to BPA in their everyday environments, Champion does not add BPA to its food, and submitted unrebutted testimony that the levels allegedly present would not be harmful to dogs. View "Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc." on Justia Law

In this case involving complex and protracted litigation regarding multiple high-interest loans between commercial borrowers and lenders the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting partial summary judgment in favor of the partnership plaintiffs and the Cambio plaintiffs, holding that there was no error.The superior court's grant of partial summary judgment primarily determined that a series of loans made by the RFP defendants was usurious and null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the accrual of interest at rates in excess of twenty-one percent per annum is deemed usurious under the usury law; (2) the release and waiver of claims provision contained in a forbearance agreement did not fall within the category of cases in which the Supreme Court will permit a debtor's release of a usury claim; and (3) the remaining allegations of error were unavailing. View "Commerce Park Realty, LLC,v. HR2-A Corp." on Justia Law

In this case involving complex litigation surrounding usurious loans between commercial borrowers and letters the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that there was no error.In the first appeal, the RFP defendants appealed from the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the receivership plaintiffs and the Cambio plaintiffs. The summary judgment declared that a series of loans made by the RFP defendants were usurious and null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed. In the second appeal, addressed in this opinion, the Cambio plaintiffs cross-appealed seeking review of secondary determinations made by the superior court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the RFP defendants on the Cambio plaintiffs' disgorgement claims; (2) the trial justice correctly ruled that the Cambio plaintiffs were not entitled to seek punitive damages against the RFP defendants under the usury statute; (3) the trial justice made correct rulings on certain stayed counts; and (4) the Cambio plaintiffs' claims under R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-2 were barred by the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-13(a). View "Commerce Park Realty, LLC v. HR2-A Corp." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court on whether Progressive Northern Insurance Company's Underinsured Motorist (UM) Exclusion--which operated to deny uninsured motorist coverage to insureds who recover at least the statutorily mandated minimum in the form of liability coverage--contravened Oklahoma's Uninsured Motorist Statute, codified at 36 O.S. section 3636. The Supreme Court responded "yes:" Because of the sweeping nature of the UM Exclusion contained in the insurance policy at issue, Progressive found a way to entirely avoid providing the promised coverage. "[A]n insurer in Oklahoma cannot deprive its policyholder of uninsured-motorist coverage for which a premium has been paid through an exclusion that effectively erases its policyholder's choice to purchase that coverage in the first place. We conclude that Progressive's UM Exclusion contravenes section 3636 and is therefore void as against public policy." View "Lane v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., did not preempt the State's in-use motor vehicle emission control system tampering claims against Volkswagen, holding that the Clean Air Act did not preempt Ohio law and preclude an anti-tampering claim under Ohio's Air Pollution Control Act, Ohio Rev. Code 3704.01 et seq.After the United States Environmental Protection Agency discovered Volkswagen's scheme to enable its vehicles to perform better than they otherwise would have on federal emissions tests, the State of Ohio sued Volkswagen for its vehicle-emissions tampering, alleging that Volkswagen's conduct violated Ohio's Air Pollution Control Act. The trial court granted Volkswagen's motion to dismiss, concluding that Ohio's anti-tampering statute was preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the federal Clean Air Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempts section 3704.16(C)(3) or precludes an anti-tampering claim under the state Air Pollution Control Act for a manufacturer's post-sale tampering with a vehicle's emissions-control system. View "State ex rel. Yost v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaf" on Justia Law