Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that PDR Network violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited advertisements by fax. The district court held that the Hobbs Act did not require it to adopt the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA (the 2006 FCC Rule) because the Hobbs Act does not control when no party "has challenged the validity of the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA." The district court concluded that, under the TCPA, unsolicited fax advertisements are not actionable unless they have a commercial purpose. The district court then determined that PDR Network's fax was not commercial in nature and dismissed the complaint without granting leave to amend.Plaintiff appealed and the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in conducting a Chevron analysis, and interpreted the 2006 FCC Rule to mean that a fax offering free goods and services qualifies as an "advertisement" under the TCPA, regardless of whether it has an underlying commercial purpose. PDR Network petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted review. The Supreme Court determined that to the extent to which the 2006 FCC Rule binds the lower courts may depend on the resolution of two preliminary sets of questions that were not aired before the Court of Appeals.On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit resolved the first five of seven issues submitted to the parties by concluding that a remand to the district court for discovery was not necessary; the relevant portions of the 2006 FCC Rule are interpretive rather than legislative; and thus the third, fourth, and fifth issues are moot. In regard to the sixth issue regarding what level of deference (if any) must the district court afford the 2006 FCC Rule, the court declined to decide in the first instance and remanded for the district court to have the first opportunity to perform the applicable analysis. Given the court's remand to the district court to consider what level of deference the court should afford the 2006 FCC Rule and what the proper meaning of "unsolicited advertisement" is in light of that deference, the court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether the district court erred by failing to grant leave to amend. View "Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. v. PDR Network, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Navient and SAC after he received almost 2,000 calls regarding his unpaid student loan, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Navient and SAC, agreeing with the district court that plaintiff expressly consented to receive Navient and SAC's calls. In this case, plaintiff reconsented to receive automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) and prerecorded calls by submitting an online demographic form. View "Lucoff v. Navient Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of constitutional Article III standing of a putative class action brought by a plaintiff, a consumer of Pop Secret popcorn. Plaintiff contends that Diamond engaged in unfair practices, created a nuisance, and breached the warranty of merchantability by including partially hydrogenated oils (PHOs) as an ingredient in Pop Secret. Plaintiff also alleges that PHOs, the primary dietary source of industrially produced trans fatty acids (also known as artificial trans fat), are an unsafe food additive that causes heart disease, diabetes, cancer, and other ailments. The panel held that plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that, as a result of her purchase and consumption of Pop Secret, she suffered economic or immediate physical injury, or that she was placed at substantial risk of adverse health consequences. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the action based on lack of standing. View "McGee v. S-L Snacks National" on Justia Law

Michael Falligant, as next friend of Michelle McElroy, who Falligant alleged was an incapacitated person, filed an action against TitleMax of Alabama, Inc. ("TitleMax"), alleging that TitleMax wrongfully repossessed and sold McElroy's vehicle. TitleMax filed a motion to compel arbitration of Falligant's claims, which the circuit court denied. TitleMax appealed. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court determined TitleMax met its burden of proving that a contract affecting interstate commerce existed, and that that contract was signed by McElroy and contained an arbitration agreement. The burden then shifted to Falligant to prove that the arbitration agreement was void. But the Court concluded Falligant failed to present substantial evidence indicating that McElroy was permanently incapacitated and, thus, lacked the mental capacity to enter into the contracts. Because Falligant failed to create a genuine issue of fact, the circuit court erred in ordering the issue of McElroy's mental capacity to trial. Accordingly, the circuit court's decision was reversed, and the matter remanded back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "TitleMax of Alabama, Inc. v. Falligant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against First Advantage, claiming that the company's upsetting report failed to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act's "maximum possible accuracy" standard.The Eleventh Circuit held that a report must be factually incorrect, objectively likely to mislead its intended user, or both to violate the maximal accuracy standard of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The court concluded that First Advantage did not violate the Act and thus there was no willful violation or any actionable reputational harm. In this case, the report was factually accurate where it stated that a registered sex offender in Pennsylvania shared plaintiff's first and last name. Furthermore, the report did not wrongfully attribute that record to plaintiff where it explained that the matching record was located using a name-only search and cautioned that the record might not be plaintiff's at all. View "Erickson v. First Advantage Background Services Corp." on Justia Law

Sun made news ink at its East Rutherford facility and purchased a dust-collection system that included a Fike suppression system to contain explosions in case of a fire in the collection system. On the first day the system was fully operational, the dust-collection system caught fire. The suppression system activated an alarm that workers did not hear. After workers saw flames and extinguished the fire, an explosion sent flames out of the dust-collector system’s ducts, severely injuring several Sun employees and causing significant property damage. The ensuing government investigations caused Sun to end production at the facility.Sun sued Fike under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J. Stat. 56:8-1, alleging that Fike misrepresented that: the suppression-system alarm would be audible and would comply with a specific industry standard; Fike would provide training to Sun employees; the suppression system had never experienced failures in the field; and the system was capable of preventing an explosion from entering the facility. The Third Circuit certified an issue to the New Jersey Supreme Court, then, consistent with the response, held that some of Sun’s CFA claims are absorbed and precluded by the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J. Stat. 2A:58C-1, and some are not. As to Sun’s remaining CFA claims, the court concluded that Sun demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sun Chemical Corp v. Fike Corp" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendants' motions to compel Plaintiff's claims to the arbitration process, holding that Defendants had the authority to enforce the arbitration provision.Jackeline Barbosa carried an overdue, unpaid balance on her credit card account. The unpaid balance was sold to Midland Funding LLC. The rights to Barbosa's account were assigned to Midland Credit Management, Inc. (MCM) Schreiber/Cohen, LLC was the law firm retained by MCM on behalf of Midland Funding to assist in MCM's debt collection efforts. Barbosa sued MCM and Schreiber/Cohen, claiming violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e and 1692f by the attempt to collect the credit card debt in Massachusetts state court after the statute of limitations for the collection action had expired. MCM and Shreiber/Cohen asked the district court to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration election provision in Barbosa's credit card agreement. The district court dismissed Barbosa's claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that MCM and Schreiber/Cohen were authorized to compel Barbosa to arbitrate her claims against them. View "Barbosa v. Midland Credit Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Plaintiff alleged that P&F violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect a debt that was no longer owed and that P&F's agent, AAS, violated the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002), precludes claims under the FDCPA. The panel held that Walls does not extend to this circumstance because plaintiff's FDCPA claims are based on the wholly independent ground of full payment, rather than being premised on a violation of the discharge order. View "Manikan v. Peters & Freedman, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ of mandamus sought by Vacation Management Solutions, LLC (VMS) to prevent the circuit court from moving forward with Kyle Klosterman's case in the City of St. Louis, holding that the action must be transferred pursuant to Mo. R. Civ. P. 51.045(c).Klosterman filed an action against VMS in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis alleging violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. VMS filed both a motion to dismiss and a motion to transfer venue, arguing that the City of St. Louis was an improper venue and that venue was proper in either Warren County or in St. Charles County. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, VMS filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that because Klosterman did not reply within thirty days to VMS's motion to transfer alleging improper venue, the circuit court was required to transfer the case to Warren County or St. Charles County. View "State ex rel. Vacation Management Solutions, LLC v. Honorable Joan L. Moriarty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Defendants' petition for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its order permitting the Attorney General to amend a complaint and granting the Attorney General's motion to sever the counts in the complaint for discovery and trial, holding that the circuit court did not err as a matter of law or exceed its legitimate powers.The order at issue permitted the parties to conduct discovery regarding whether the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitation on the Attorney General's claim that Defendants violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (CCPA) and allowed the parties to discover and present evidence on whether Defendants committed multiple violations of the CCPA such that the circuit court might consider imposing multiple penalties. The Supreme Court denied Defendants' petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction and did not exceed its legitimate powers. View "State, ex rel. 3M Co. v. Hoke" on Justia Law